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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effect of regional wage subsidies to foster permanent employment for a sample of temporary 
and unemployed Spanish workers. We study the transition into permanent employment using a new dataset based on 
administrative Social Security registers named “La Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”, which is used for the first 
time to carry out policy evaluation exercises in the Spanish labor market. This dataset offers important advantages 
with respect to the Labour Force Survey, given it offers the complete labor history of the worker. Moreover, since we 
have individual, regional and time variation in our policy measure, we can apply a difference-in-differences estimator 
to identify the average treatment effect of this policy. Though, these regional policies have been implemented for 
almost ten years, as far as we know, this is the first attempt to evaluate them. Our main results are that, in average 
terms, this policy has positive but small effects on the transition rate into permanent employment either from a 
temporary contract or from unemployment.  The incidence of these subsidies, however, is larger when the worker is 
in a temporary contract. It is also larger for young females while for old male workers do not have any effect. 
Measured at the average wage subsidy (5100 Euros) the total change in the entrance probability from a temporary to a 
permanent contract is around 26% for young women, 24% for middle age ones and 22% for middle age men, the 
most benefited workers. Nevertheless, since the transition rates to permanent contracts at the same firm are pretty low 
these relative changes hardly generate a change in the transition probability from a temporary to a permanent contract 
at the same firm. For instance, in the case of young women the estimated transition probability growths from 0.064% 
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1  Introduction 
In the last decade, fixed-term contracts have taken center stage in the economic debate on labor 
market reforms in Europe. The debate has mostly focused on the magnitude and characteristics 
of the phenomenon: very rapidly, temporary jobs have become a major novelty in the European 
labor markets. In this context, Spain is a paradigmatic example since it is the European country 
with the highest rate of temporary contracts, and this position has been maintained since the first 
half of the 1990s. This rapid expansion of temporary contracts has fuelled researches´ effort to 
understand their effects on labor market outcomes. On one hand, it is suggested that, they 
provide workers with a stepping-stone towards permanent employment (Booth, Francesconi and 
Frank, 2002). On the other hand, there is an increasing evidence that they might represent a 
“dead-end”, in that they further segment the labor market between insiders holding permanent 
contracts and outsiders who find themselves confined at the margins, trapped between spells of 
unemployment and temporary contracts (for the Spanish evidence see Guell and Petrongolo, 
2007 or Rebollo, 2006). This kind of concern has led policy-makers to intervene on fixed-term 
contracts in the recent years in an attempt to reduce their negative effects. According to OECD 
(2002), governments have intervened both by setting restrictions on the adoption of temporary 
contracts and by providing employers with incentives to either hire workers on permanent 
positions or convert temporary jobs into permanent ones. Spain is also a paradigmatic example 
in this context as both kinds of policies have been implemented since the second half of the 
nineties.  
In the eighties, Spain was one of the tightest labor markets and its rate of unemployment was 
one of the highest in the OECD. This led Spanish policy makers to implement flexibility 
measures like the well-known 1984 labor market reform. The flexibilization strategy mainly 
consisted of introducing the possibility of hiring workers on flexible, fixed-duration contracts. 
As a result of this reform, temporary contracts rose from 18% in 1987 to 33% of all employees 
in 1994. Given this high rate, in 1997 and 2001 there were new regulations aimed at contracting 
the scope for using fixed-term contracts by reducing the firing costs for new permanent 
employees
1. Additionally, since 1997, the Spanish government has subsidized the creation of 
permanent contracts by, in some cases, large discounts in firm’s payroll taxes on new permanent 
contracts. During the same period, some regions also implemented wage subsidies for new 
permanent contracts. As a result, Spain has become the OECD country with the highest 
percentage of GDP, 0.28% in the period 1999-2002, devoted to subsidy permanent, 
employment. Hence, this is an important policy that, at least potentially, has affected many 
Spanish workers. As such, a rigorous evaluation of the program may lead to insights regarding 
the benefits of this policy. Yet, so far we can only find one research devoted to the evaluation of 
                                                 
1 In the reform of 1997 a new permanent contract was designed. The main differential characteristic of this new contract was its 
lower firing costs. Nevertheless, it was aimed at certain population groups, mainly long term unemployed and young workers. For 








the effects of the 1997 reform into the permanent employment rate Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz 
(2003).  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of regional wage subsidies to foster 
permanent employment. It is important to mention that though, these regional policies have 
been implemented for almost ten years, as far as we know, this is the first attempt to evaluate 
them. Our evaluation exercise focuses on the effects of wage subsidies over the flow to a 
permanent contract. Firstly, we study the conversion rate from a temporary to a permanent 
contract at the same firm considering also the alternatives of unemployment, moving to a 
different firm or having another temporary contract at the same firm. Secondly, we examine the 
transition rate from unemployment to a permanent contract also taking into account the 
alternative of getting a temporary contract. Thirdly, we check whether there are any substitution 
effects by examining the incidence of regional wage subsidies over the exit probability from a 
permanent contract considering as competing alternatives unemployment, a temporary contract 
and other permanent contract.  
We take advantage from the multidimensional variability of the eligibility rules of these 
subsidies, since they vary across individuals, regions and time to identify the policy effects. 
Besides, the variation of the permanent employment rate among Spanish regions is somehow 
large and it differs from the variability found in regional wage subsidies: meanwhile the 
Southern regions show rates of permanent employment lower than 60%, in regions as Madrid or 
La Rioja these rates are basically similar to the European standards. Hence, as it happens with 
unemployment, the South of Spain concentrates a larger fraction of temporary contracts than in 
the rest of the country. At the same time, however, regions with a low rate of temporary 
employment, such as Madrid, have also implemented large wage subsidies on new permanent 
contracts.  
Since we have longitudinal data, and given the characteristics of the policy to be analyzed, we 
consider that the best approach to study the effect of this policy is the difference-in-differences 
estimator (DID, hereafter). Our policy variable is based on the maximum amount of the wage 
subsidy offered for the eligible individual in each region. We identify the treatment effect using 
three dimensions of variability: i) between workers of the same region but with different 
individual characteristics; ii) between similar workers of different regions; iii) between periods 
with wage subsidies and periods without them. Thus, we extend the familiar DID approach to a 
Difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator (DDD).  
We use a new administrative database obtained from the Social Security records (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales) where we have available the whole labor history of the worker. 
One contribution of this paper is the use of this dataset for the first time. It is highly interesting 
since it offers information about more than one million workers to study labor market 
transitions in the Spanish labor market and the effectiveness of these regional wage subsidies. 
Such transitions may be much accurately studied with this dataset, which overcomes the typical 








We obtain that the impact of regional wage subsidies differs by gender and age and depends on 
the initial labor state of the worker. Firstly, the incidence of wage subsidies is larger from a 
temporary contract than from unemployment. Secondly, the impact of regional wage subsidies 
is the largest for young female workers while is zero for old workers. When the initial state is a 
temporary contract the benefited workers are young and middle age women and middle age 
men. For the rest of workers with temporary contracts the impact is not statistically significant. 
For the sample of unemployed, young workers are the most benefited ones followed by middle 
age ones. Thirdly, wage subsidies on new permanent contract might favor the permanence of 
employees at the same firm but by accumulating temporary contracts. Fourthly, we do not find 
evidence of substitution effects except for young female workers. Interestingly, we find that 
wage subsidies foster the transition between permanent contracts and between permanent and 
temporary contracts for treated workers. 
Therefore, we conclude that the labor demand by type of contract in Spain hardly varies with 
wage subsidies on new permanent contracts. The average wage subsidy represents a discount of 
around 25% of the monthly labor cost while the conversion rate from a temporary to a 
permanent contract increases by 26% for young women, 24% for middle age ones and 22% for 
middle age men. The incidence of wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent 
contract from unemployment is even smaller and it reaches the maximum for young workers. 
The total variation in the exit probability to a permanent contract is 14.97% and 14.4%, 
respectively. The impact for middle age workers is 6% for women and 8% for men. 
Nevertheless, since the transition rates to permanent contracts are pretty low these relative 
changes hardly generate a change in the transition probability to a permanent contract. For 
instance, in the case of young women the estimated transition probability from a temporary to a 
permanent contract at the same firm growths from 0.064% to 0.075% while for middle age men 
it changes from 0.039% to 0.041%. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we will briefly review previous research on 
the use of temporary contracts, emphasizing those focused on the Spanish case. In Section 3, we 
describe the main characteristics of the regional wage subsidies. Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe the 
econometric approach, the data used and the main results. Finally, Section 7 presents our main 
conclusions. 
2  Background 
Wage subsidy programs have been implemented in many OECD countries, as an important 
measure to foster labor market integration of disadvantaged workers, not only in countries using 
the most interventionist approach to labor market policy such as France, Germany or Sweden, 
but also in countries firmly attached to the Anglo-Saxon model of the labor market, like USA, 
UK, and Canada. Nevertheless, two recent surveys of labor market policies in a number of 








active labor market policies (ALMPs, from now on). Heckmam (1999) states, after surveying a 
large number of studies about European ALMPs, that they can not conclude any ALMP 
consistently yields greater employment impact than any other. On the contrary, Martin and 
Grubb (2001) conclude that in several OECD countries, evaluations have found that wage 
subsidies programs have a greater impact than public training programs on direct job creation 
measures. 
There are various forms of wage subsidy schemes in different countries. Wage subsidies can be 
paid either to employers or to employees. The subsidy itself can be paid as a tax credit, as a 
reduction in Social Security contributions or as a direct payment. Although, wage subsidy 
programmes have much variance in their designs, their ultimate goal is to increase employment 
through lowered labour costs or increased labour supply. In the case of targeted wage subsidy, 
this policy aims to provide increased employment opportunities to the targeted worker group by 
changing labour demands to be favourable towards the targeted worker. However, wage subsidy 
programmes have been criticised due to their high levels of deadweight losses and substitution 
effects. Also, some subsidy programmes have encountered low participation of employers.  
Despite the fact that economists have advocated employment subsidies for a long time, there are 
only a few theoretical models which provide analytical results concerning the effect of 
employment subsidies on labor market flows. Katz (1986) provides a partial equilibrium 
dynamics analysis of wage subsidies for low-wage workers. The employer-side wage subsidy is 
expected to stimulate the demand for workers, and shifting out the labor demand curve by 
reducing the cost of labor relative to other inputs. Katz points out that, in a situation of structural 
unemployment in which the effective labor supply is completely elastic, a proportional wage 
subsidy will not affect the wage of the worker, but will increase employment in proportion to 
the elasticity of labor demand for low-wage workers. However, these impacts could be reduced 
by indirect effects of wage subsidies, at least in the short-run. The indirect effects that have 
received special attention in relation to wage subsidies are the deadweight loss, the substitution 
effect and the displacement effect (Calmfors, 1994). The deadweight loss is defined as the 
hiring from the target group that would have occurred also in the absence of the programme. 
Calmfors also define the substitution effect as the extent to which jobs created for a certain 
group of workers simply replace jobs for other categories, because relative wage costs are 
changed. This effect might occur when the subsidy is targeted on a subgroup. The displacement 
effect is defined as the possible reduction of jobs elsewhere in the economy because of 
competition in goods market. This effect can occurs when a firm with subsidized workers 
increases output, but displaces output among firms who do not have subsidized workers and as a 
result, the subsidy crowds out employment.  
There is a more recent theoretical work that offers new insights about the effects of subsidies on 
employment creation. Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) deliver insight into the effect of 
different types of subsidies on job creation and job destruction by integrating subsidies in search 








their analysis is that they distinguish two possible scenarios. One in which the unemployment 
benefit replacement ratio is moderate and unemployment protection legislation is weak, as in the 
US, and another in which both the level of unemployment compensation and the extent of 
employment protection are relatively high, as in Europe. The outcome variables studied are the 
steady state unemployment rate, the average wage and the aggregate income. Hence, their 
results mainly could help us to understand the effects of wage subsidies over the transition rate 
from unemployment to a permanent contract. In their analysis, they distinguish two types of 
subsidies: hiring subsidies paid at once, at the start of an employment spell, and employment 
subsidies which provide a flow of subsidies during the job duration. They also present the 
results for two levels of worker skill (high and low productivity worker). The values of the 
subsidy considered in their simulations range from 0 to 20% of the average wage. These values 
are similar to the average wage subsidy we are analyzing. Their main findings for economies 
with high unemployment compensation and stringent employment protection can be 
summarized as follows: hiring subsidies lead to shorter unemployment durations but increase 
unemployment incidence for high skill workers while it reduces for low skill workers. The 
reason for this difference is the asymmetric effect of firing costs on job creation by skills levels: 
the hiring subsidy may offset the negative effect of the firing cost on job creation for low skill 
workers. Therefore, a hiring subsidy can decrease employment by encouraging too much 
replacement of old jobs with new too frequently and consequently lead to a higher turnover on 
the labor market. This last situation might take place mainly when the hiring subsidy offset the 
effects of employment protection, mainly firing costs. The idea is that a hiring subsidy 
stimulates job creation, however once the job is created, the opportunity cost of maintaining the 
match rises since the hiring subsidy can again be obtained when creating a new job.  
Since in this model there are not differences on firing costs by type of contracts the theoretical 
conclusions can not be generally applied to the situation we analyzed in this research. 
Nevertheless, it offers some interesting insights. The 1997 reform created a new permanent 
contract with lower firing costs for certain group of workers. Additionally, it introduced 
discounts in payroll taxes for new permanent contracts for certain type of workers
2. All these 
facts might have introduced a significant discount in labor costs for certain type of workers 
(mainly young workers)
3. Therefore, it could happen that the introduction of wage subsidies 
could have given rise to a situation in which hiring subsidies compensate the dismissal costs and 
as a result they have encouraged transitions between new permanent contracts.  
                                                 
2 The 1997 reform initially reduced firing costs by around 25% and payroll taxes by between 40% and 60% for newly signed 
permanent contracts –disabled workers had larger discounts-, and 25% and 60% for all conversions of temporary into permanent 
contracts, but after 1999 these reductions applied only for conversions of young and older workers. These discounts in payroll taxes 
were mainly applied during the first year of the contract though in some cases they could be extended to two years. The groups of 
workers who received the larger discounts in labour costs for new permanent contracts were younger and older workers, long term 
unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations and disabled workers.  
3 For instance, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) estimate that dismissal costs and payroll taxes account for about 1.9% and 21.6% 
of total labour costs for young men workers, respectively. Given the corresponding percentage change in payroll taxes and dismissal 
costs as a result of the reform, the percentage reductions in total labour costs implied by the reform for young men they estimate it 








There are two additional papers that consider explicitly a labour market characterized by two 
types of labor contracts: one without firing costs and other with large firing costs. Dolado, 
Garcia-Serrano and Jimeno (2002) consider the existence of dismissal costs and argue that the 
equilibrium ratio of temporary to permanent employees is determined by the ratio among unit 
labor costs
4 under each of those contracts, the elasticity of substitution between temporary and 
permanent workers, the volatility of labor demand along the business cycle and the average 
economic growth rate. They distinguish three components within the concept of labour costs: 
the wage, the firing cost and the hiring costs. If we interpret the wage subsidy as a drop in the 
hiring cost for new permanent employees relative to temporary ones, the effect of this policy 
should be to increase the transition rate to permanent contracts and consequently the permanent 
employment rate.  
Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) analyze the effectiveness of a labor market reform 
consisting in a drop of firing costs and an introduction of discounts in payroll taxes of new 
permanent contracts to reduce the share of temporary workers. The final aim was to analyze the 
impact of the Spanish labor market reform of 1997 into the permanent employment rate. 
Moreover, given the characteristics of the reform, it might provide an interesting estimate of the 
elasticity of permanent employment with respect to non-wage labor costs. They develop a 
simple dynamic matching model similar to Blanchard and Landier (2002) but they endogenize 
dismissals and introduce payroll taxes. In their model the demand for permanent and temporary 
employment depends on two productivity thresholds that depend, among other things, on 
dismissal costs and payroll taxes. Given the values of the two productivity thresholds they can 
derive the steady-state values of temporary and permanent employment. Their theoretical 
discussion shows that the 1997 reform should, more likely than previous reforms, have 
increased employment levels. Their model suggests that a reduction in dismissal costs for 
permanent workers increases hiring and firing and therefore has an ambiguous effect on 
unemployment. On the contrary, a reduction in payroll taxes for permanent contracts increases 
conversions from temporary to permanent contracts but leaves dismissals unchanged so the net 
effect is to increase permanent employment. Their empirical results suggest that reducing the 
costs of permanent employment may be of special value for younger workers. They obtain that 
the transition probability to permanent employment increased between 30% and 46% for 
younger men and between 14% and 24% for younger women during the reforms years. The 
results for older workers were insignificant. They estimate the elasticity of permanent 
employment to non-wage labor costs and they find a fairly elastic response of permanent 
employment to non-wage labor costs for younger workers, for whom the payroll tax reduction 
was relatively more important.  
Though the characteristics of the reform they analyzed were different from our policy analysis,  
main theoretical implications can be applied to the policy evaluated in this paper from the point 
                                                 
4In this line, García-Pérez and Rebollo (2006) show how the behaviour of unit labour costs is an important determinant of the 
divergences in the permanent employment rate across Spanish regions. They show that regions with larger unit labour costs will 









of view that wage subsidies imply a drop in hiring costs of new permanent contracts keeping 
these costs constant for temporary contracts.  
2.1  Some Previous Empirical Results 
The recent microeconometric evaluation literature on wage subsidies has mainly focused on two 
different outcomes. A first branch of research looks at the effects of wage subsidies over the 
probability of being unemployment (Gerfin et al, 2005). Other studies focus on the transition 
rate out of unemployment (e.g. Lubjova and Van Ours, 1999; Fredriksson and Johansson, 2004, 
Forslund, Johansson and Lindqvist, 2004; Gobel and Cokx, 2005) and the transition rate to 
permanent employment (Cipollone and Guelfi, 2003). Lubjova and Van Ours (1999) have 
evaluated the effect on the transition rate to regular employment of two different subsidies 
employment program for the Slovak Republic. They report a positive effect of the short-term 
subsidies in the public sector and a negative effect for the two year subsidized jobs in the private 
sector. Forslund, Johansson and Lindqvist (2004) evaluate an employment subsidy program in 
Swedish and conclude that employment subsidies increased the flows into jobs of participants 
compared to non-participants
5. Gobel and Cokx study the impact of subsidized employment for 
long-term unemployed workers in Belgium on the transition rate from employment to non-
employment
6 and find that the policy decreases this transition rate only in the first year of 
participation whereas for men it increases after participation. Cipollone and Guelfi (2003) 
examine the effects of a tax credit to firms choosing to hire workers under permanent contracts 
for the Italian economy. They conclude that firms use this tax credit provision to hire under 
permanent contracts workers who, on average, turn out to have the highest probability of being 
permanently hired even without the subsidy.    
It is difficult to draw general conclusions from these recent empirical studies. The programme 
implementation
7, labor market conditions and the institutional setting in the different countries 
seem to play a role for the effect of subsidized employment. Our paper contributes to the 
literature by evaluating the effect of wage subsidies on new permanent contracts over the 
transition rate to permanent employment from unemployment and from a temporary contract.  
3  Regional Wage Subsidies on new permanent contracts 
The promotion of permanent contracts has emerged as an important labor market policy from 
both the regional and national level in a lot of countries. Besides, this importance has been 
increasing since the second half of the 1990s, so nowadays, Spain devotes an important amount 
of resources to the promotion of permanent employment.
8 In the case of wage subsidies on new 
                                                 
5 They follow a matching and instrumental variables in their econometric approach. 
6 They account for selective participation on the basis of a multivariate duration model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity. 
7 Differences in the eligibility criteria for the treated group, the duration and amount of the subsidies might play a role for the 
effectiveness of a program.  
8 For instance, Spain devoted 50% of total ALMPs expenditure on subsidized employment during the period 1996-2002. Only Italy 








permanent contracts, this is an initiative that several Spanish regions established since 1997 
when the national government implemented important discounts in firm’s payroll taxes on new 
permanent contracts. While this last policy is common for all Spanish workers, regional wage 
subsidies have varied between and within regions, by individual characteristics and along time 
in two dimensions during the period 1997-2004: i) the eligibility conditions; ii) the amount of 
the subsidies. The eligibility rules are mainly based on some individual characteristics of the 
worker such as age and gender
9. For example, some regions offer these subsidies only for 
women whereas others restrict their use just for young workers. Besides these eligibility 
conditions might vary within a region and across time. On the other hand, the amount of the 
wage subsidy has also varied. These facts allow us to examine the response of different group of 
individuals to the change in incentives. 
One of the main characteristics of the policy we are analyzing is that the firm that hires the 
worker must apply for the subsidy to receive it. We can not identify which worker has 
effectively been benefited from this regional policy given the origin of our dataset, Social 
Security registers. Therefore, our treatment group will be composed by workers who fulfill the 
eligibility criteria and consequently, our analysis will measure the potential impact of regional 
wage subsidies over the creation of new permanent contracts. That is, it is possible that workers 
considered as potentially treated are not effectively treated by this policy and therefore, our 
analysis could overestimate the incidence of wage subsidies over the entrance rate to new 
permanent contracts. Nevertheless, since this subsidy implies a drop in total labor costs for the 
firm, it is plausible to assume that the firm will apply for it whenever the eligibility conditions 
are fulfilled.  
Our data of regional wage subsidies is taken from each regional government and it only covers 
wage subsidies at the regional level
10. The main characteristics of these wage subsidies are 
described in Tables 1 and 2. The average subsidy for each region and by age and gender, in 
2002 Euros, is shown in Table 1, with their minimum and maximum amount. As it is shown in 
Table 1, this policy was implemented since 1997 in some regions, whereas in others it was 
implemented afterwards or never, as in Cataluña or Navarra
11. Table 1 also shows that the 
eligibility conditions vary notably among regions and time. We find regions as Andalusia where 
the policy applies to all workers while other focus this policy on certain group of workers such 
as women or young workers.  
We also wonder whether the effectiveness of these wage subsidies depends on the amount of the 
subsidy. The idea is that the larger the amount of the subsidy the larger is the reduction in labor 
costs when the firm hires a permanent contract and the larger should be the incidence of the 
policy over the entrance rate to new permanent contracts. That is, it could be that the policy 
                                                 
9 The eligibility conditions of the regional wage subsidies may also depend on other variables such as the labour state of the worker 
or certain characteristics of the firm such as the type of activity. Nevertheless, given we can not control for all the eligibility 
conditions in our database, we have finally opted to consider only eligibility conditions based on age and gender.  
10 It could be that some local governments also offer wage subsides or any other kind of public subsidy to foster permanent 
contracts. 
11 Before 1997 we can find regional policies to foster employment for specific group of workers. Those regional policies are not 








does not foster permanent contracts because the wage subsidy does not significantly cover the 
larger labor costs related to the new permanent contract. In Table 2 we display a summary of the 
regional wage subsidies by region and individual characteristics. Again, we can observe there is 
a strong variability in the intensity of the policy among regions and by personal characteristics. 
Moreover, the contribution provided by this subsidy looks quite generous. Last column of Table 
2 shows the percentage reduction in per-cápita labor costs due to the subsidy (using data for the 
year 2000) by regions. The evidences show a labor cost reduction which ranges from 9% in 
Baleares, the region with the lowest subsidy, to more than 60% in Extremadura. Therefore, we 
will use this additional source of variability to identify the average effect of the policy over the 
transition rate to a new permanent contract.  
We face one shortcoming with this type of information that it is important to mention. The data 
available refers to the maximum wage subsidy the firm can receive per contract and year. 
Initially it seems more reasonable to use the minimum wage subsidy but in many cases the 
information available fixes this minimum at zero. The use of the maximum wage subsidy 
implies that our results measure the maximum incidence of the subsidy. 
4  The Empirical Approach: Identification and Estimation Method  
Our goal in this paper is to measure the causal effect of regional wage subsidies over the flow to 
a permanent contract either from the conversion of a temporary contract or from unemployment. 
For this exercise we will estimate three duration models following a multiple risk approach to 
avoid the biases related to single risk models. Firstly, we estimate the transition from a 
temporary contract considering that the worker can move to unemployment or other firm, other 
temporary contract at the same firm or to a permanent one also at the same firm. Secondly, we 
estimate the transition from unemployment considering that the worker can exit to a temporary 
contract or to a permanent one. Thirdly, we estimate the exit rate from a permanent contract 
considering as competing alternatives unemployment, other temporary contract and other 
permanent contract.  
As it is traditional in the literature of duration models the objective here is to estimate the exit or 
hazard rate. For each individual we observe the duration in a determined state -duration of an 
episode of temporary contract or unemployment-, from t=1 up to the month k in which the 
individual changes of situation to any of the competing alternatives. A common alternative to 
estimate the hazard rate consists of transforming the duration model in a sequence of discrete 
choice equations defined on the surviving population at each duration (Jenkins, 1995). In this 
case, we define a binary variable  ylkt, that takes value one when the worker changes state at time 
t from l to state k, and zero otherwise. This expression has exactly the same form that the 
likelihood function of a discreet choice model where ylkt is the binary endogenous dependent 








intervals -months in this case-, in which the worker has remained in the initial situation (Allison, 
1982; Jenkins, 1995). Hence our likelihood function for each individual is:   
(1)  () ( )()
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where Πlkt is the conditional exit rate, that is, the hazard rate from state l to the destination state 
k: 
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4.1  The identification approach 
Our econometric approach to identify the treatment effect of these regional wage subsidies is 
directly linked to the standard causal effects analysis. In particular, we follow a Difference-In-
Differences (DID, hereafter) approach.  
To estimate the effect of policies on economic behaviour one needs a source of policy variation. 
Empirical studies tend to use spatial and temporal variation for estimating the effect of 
government policies on economic outcomes (Besley and Case, 2000). Our identification 
strategy of the policy incidence is interesting because we use several dimensions of the policy 
variability. The individual, regional and time variability of the wage subsidies provides us with 
many sources of identification of the unbiased estimator of the policy effect. That is, we use 
similar workers in different regions and different workers within the same region as control 
groups. The treatment to be analysed is the wage subsidy. Therefore, the treatment group is 
composed of those potentially affected by the policy at time t . Obviously, the control group
12 is 
those workers who are not potentially affected by the wage subsidy at time t.  
The general specification of the competing risk duration model we estimate is the following for 
each origin state: 
(3)  ( )
''
01 2 3 45 6 () ijt t ijt t jt ijt ij j t jt i it ijt Ft x z D D D D D D D δ αγβ ββββ ββε Π= + + + + + + + + + +  (3) 
where i stands for individuals, j for regions and t for time; the function δ(t) control for the 
duration dependence of the process; the matrix xijt  contains covariates that vary among 
individuals and are mainly related to time varying personal and labor characteristics; zjt stands 
for time varying covariates specific to the region where the individual works
13. These variables 
                                                 
12 Good control groups will be those whose behaviour has evolved similarly to those of the group experiencing the policy change 
and who respond similarly to changes in the variables that derive policies to change. The appeal of the DID estimation comes from 
its simplicity as well as its potentiality to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making 
comparisons between heterogeneous individuals (See Meyer 1995, for an overview).  
13 Besley and Case (2000) shows that fixed effects models might mislead the effect of the policy. A potential source of bias is due to 
the presence of unobservable variables that may determine both the policy and the outcome of interest. In our case, it could be 








help to identify an unbiased estimate of the policy’s effects as they adequately reflect the 
incidence of changes in other variables that are simultaneously influencing outcomes of the 
control and treated group under study. This idea is relevant since using individual and regional 
time varying covariates, we extend identification to those instances in which observed 
compositional differences between treated and controls cause non-parallel dynamics in the 
outcome variable.  
The wage policy variable is Dijt and takes a positive value that represents the wage subsidy when 
the worker i, located in region j at time t is living in a region with wage subsidies and she is 
eligible, and zero in other case
14. The rest of “D” variables help to identify an unbiased estimate 
of the average treatment effect of the policy: 
Dj=1  ⇔ Worker is located in a treated region 
Di=1  ⇔ Individual characteristics of the worker are eligible independently of being in a 
treated region at the time the policy is implemented. 
Dij=1  ⇔ Worker belongs to the eligible group in a treated region 
Djt=1   ⇔ Worker is in a region that applies the wage subsidy at time t, independently of 
being eligible within a region 
Dj=1  ⇔ Worker is located in a treated region 
Dit=1   ⇔ Worker has eligible characteristics at time t, independently of being in a treated 
region. 
Dt=1  ⇔ Policy is implemented at time “t” 
 
Summarizing, the variables Di, Dj and Dij control for permanent differences between eligible and 
non eligible workers, treated and non-treated regions and eligible and non-eligibles individuals 
within a region, respectively. The variables Dit and Djt controls for time-varying individual and 
regional effects. Finally, Dt controls from common aggregate effects to treated and non-treated 
workers that could influence the outcome variable. Formally, the analysis should include all the 
variables pointed out above but given the characteristics of the policy we face with several 
restrictions. For instance, the effect of the covariates Di and Dit can not be identified directly but 
                                                                                                                                               
existence and generosity of the policy and the type of contracts in a particular region. Therefore, the individual variability in the 
eligibility conditions within regions plays an important role in this study. 
14 Initially, our policy variable was a dummy variable that took value one when the worker i, located in region j at time t was living 
in a region with wage subsidies and she was eligible, and zero in other case. But with this specification we lost one dimension of 
variability in the policy variable. Since, in DID approach policy variation is fundamental we have opted to analyze the incidence of 








by including in xijt the covariates that determine the eligibility conditions, basically age and 
gender.  
Therefore, the key issue from a policy point of view concerns the sign, size and significance of 
the estimated parameter β0 that measures the true effect of the policy once we have controlled 
for all the covariates that could simultaneously affect the treatment and the outcome. The 
estimation of the policy incidence on the treatment group, β0, is estimated as the post-treatment 
change in the outcome for the treatment group, after controlling for the mean change in 
outcomes observed pre and post-treatment and for the mean differences in outcomes between 
the treatment and the control group. The parameters β1 and β2 are the treatment group and 
region specific effects and they account for average permanent differences between the 
treatment and control group in the first case and between treated regions and non-treated region 
in the second case
15. The parameter β3  and  β4  show the existence of national and regional 
aggregate effects from the policy. Finally εijt is the error term whose composition is the 
following:  
(4)  ijt i ijt εη υ =+           ( 4 )  
where ηi describes unobserved time-invariant differences and υijt the random error term of the 
model. We will assume that the random component υijt is independent of both, the individual 
and the region effects. Recall that one advantage of the DID approach is that it controls for 
unobserved time-invariant differences. Therefore the estimation of the parameter β0 should be 
the same when estimating the model with and without unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless 
we will also estimate the model with a control for unobserved heterogeneity in order to test 
whether the policy parameter β0 changes. Nevertheless, this is really relevant in the analysis of 
the duration dependence of the exit rate
16.  
There are two main identification assumptions maintained in this DID estimation. The first one 
is that, apart from the control variables, there are no other forces affecting treatment and control 
groups. In addition, the composition of the treatment and control group must remain stable 
overtime
17. Therefore, to provide an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, it must be the 
case that either –unobserved- time varying regional and individual variables did not change 
between the pre and post-treatment period or that they changed in an identical manner in the 
control and treatment group. One reason for these assumptions to be violated is the fact that 
                                                 
15 The inclusion of these variables comes from the fact that we are not working with a truly randomised experiment. Note that in a 
randomised experiment, where subjects are randomly selected into treatment and control groups, β1 should be zero, as both groups 
should be nearly identical.  
16 It is well known that duration analysis produce incorrect results if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. On average, subjects with 
relatively hazard high hazard rates for unobserved reasons leave the state of interest first, so that samples of survivors are selected. 
Differences between such samples at different times reflect behavioural differences as well as this selection effects. Nevertheless, 
with a Difference in Differences approach the concern of the effects of unobserved heterogeneity on the policy parameter should not 
be relevant. Therefore, we will estimate the model with unobserved heterogeneity as a specification test over the policy variable. We 
follow the approach proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984) to specify the heterogeneity term. We assume that each hazard rate 
has two support points. Besides, we allowed two types of individuals, so that each type is characterized by a unique set of points of 
support and the corresponding probability. 








individuals eligible for the wage subsidy could react to it in anticipation of the policy.
18 
Nevertheless, we consider that the strong variability in the eligibility conditions across regions 
and time and the use of regional and individual time varying covariates provides us with a 
control group that matches these two requirements. For instance, the anticipation of the policy 
could affect the results when the analysis cover a short period after the policy is implemented. 
In this context, one can argue that firms act strategically to get the highest reward from the 
policy. But this is not the case in this analysis since there are regions where the policy remains 
unchanged for several years. Therefore we consider that in this case the incidence of the 
anticipation effect on our estimations should not be relevant.  
Moreover, much of the debate around the validity of a DID estimate typically evolves around 
the possible endogeneity of the interventions themselves (See Besley and Case, 2000).
19 In this 
paper, as it is common in many panel data studies
20, we will include time varying regional 
variables as well as regional effects to control for permanent and transitory differences across 
regions in policies and outcomes
21.  
Other issue related to the definition of the comparison group is whether we can assume that the 
two groups of workers –treated and non treated-, are subject to the same aggregate labor market 
trends and react in the same way. Evidently, this assumption is more plausible when we split the 
effect of the wage subsidy by age and gender to the extent that the human capital of each groups 
is similar and also preferences for work should be the same. For instance, preferences for work 
between the eligible group in their early twenties and the eligible group in their middle thirties 
may, however, not be the same as this is the age that many people have children. This might 
generate differential aggregate trends across groups. So we estimate the average treatment effect 
by gender and age groups. Moreover, as we will show in the statistical section, there are 
significant differences in the impact of these wage subsidies across gender and age groups. This 
makes most likely that the overall characteristics and behavior of the control group match that 
of the treatment group. Such an approach is similar to the discontinuity design (Hahn, Todd and 
Van der Klauss, 1999). Nevertheless, the substitution effects are likely to be much more severe 
the closer are the productivity characteristics of the two groups. In the event of substitution, the 
impact of the program for the eligible group is biased upwards by the fact that the outcome for 
the control group is decreasing. Nevertheless we avoid this bias by including in the model the 
variable Djt which was described above. 
                                                 
18 In our case this could apply when firms anticipate the policy. 
19 Besley and Case (2000) show that the inclusion or exclusion of variables that determine both policy and behavioural outcomes 
dramatically alters the estimated impact of the policy when the identification strategy relies exclusively on regional variability. Their 
findings are a reminder that inadequate controls for time-varying regional level variables may bias estimates of the policy incidence 
identified from regional-level policy variation. They suggest that one way of dealing with these concerns is the DID approach. That 
is to try to identify the policy effect by selecting a control group of workers in the same industry or occupation in regions where the 
policy variable did not change, among regions thought to be similar to that whose policy has changed.  
20 See Anderson and Meyer (1997), Gruber and Madrian (1997). 
21 If the systematic determinants of state policies are additive, time invariant regional characteristics, then will indeed remove 








5  Data Description: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales  
We use a new dataset recently available in Spain which is named “Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales” (MCVL, hereafter). This is an administrative dataset based on a random draw from 
the Social Security archives. It contains a sample of 4% among all the affiliated workers, 
working or not, and pensioners in the year 2004. Since it is an administrative data set it is free of 
sample selection bias due to informative dropout. Besides, as it covers the whole labor market 
history of the worker it does not suffer from the typical problem of left censored information of 
previous labor market experiences to the one analyzed
22. 
This dataset has information about 1,1 million people and covers their entire labor history. The 
amount of information for each individual in our database is quite large and we have imposed 
some restrictions. Firstly, there may exist one different register for each contract held. In the 
Spanish labor market it is quite usual to find firms that optimize their labor costs by the mean of 
firing the workers in short periods of time and hiring them again after that
23. In these situations 
we consider that the employment spell is actually continuing although it has a short interruption 
in the middle. Hence, we unified successive registers when they correspond to the same worker 
in the same firm and with the same type of contract and when the interruption is lower than 15 
days. Secondly, we have eliminated simultaneous employment spells and we kept the 
information about the longer one. Thirdly, we have unified each two registers when they 
correspond to one contract that begins before the previous one has finished. Fourthly, we have 
eliminated each incomplete or incorrect register. This may happen because some important 
information is missing or because it is clearly incorrect (dates of beginning and finishing 
incompatible, etc.). Finally, we are only considering labor histories of workers within the called 
“Regimen General”, that is, regular workers being paid by a firm. We are not using information 
for self-employed and either for workers in Agriculture, Fish and other minor special cases. 
Given the problem of too much missing information regarding the type of contract for the spells 
before 1995, we will only study the employment spells (and non-employment spells), beginning 
after the end of 1994. Nevertheless, we will use the information previous to 1995 to control for 
the labor market history of the worker in terms of their previous employment and 
unemployment experiences.  
This database offers information about the personal characteristics of the worker and also about 
all the employment spells throughout her labor history. We have information about age, gender, 
occupation, unemployment and employment spells and their respective exact durations. This 
last information is especially relevant given the aim of the paper. Other databases only gather 
annual or quarterly information and therefore individual labor market transitions within a year 
are not available giving rise to an under-representation of short-term temporary contracts. The 
duration of each employment spell is built from the dates of beginning and ending the contract 
                                                 
22 Preceding labour market histories are known to have a strong impact on the probabilities of accessing into a permanent contract.  








and it is measured in months.
24 Moreover, for the periods of non-employment, we can 
distinguish among the ones when the payroll taxes are being paid, that is, when the worker is 
receiving Unemployment Benefits and those when the worker contributions to Social Security 
are not paid, which can be both periods of unemployment without benefits or periods of 
inactivity. Hence, we use the terminology non-employment to name all these spells of not 
working within a firm. Other interesting characteristic of this database is that each firm has an 
authentication code. This last aspect is fundamental since it allows identifying whether the 
worker remains in the same firm after changing the contract or after the unemployment spell.  
The impact of these regional wage subsidies are evaluated by looking at transition probabilities 
to new permanent contracts either from unemployment or from a temporary contract at the same 
firm. We define three types of transitions from a temporary contract: exit to unemployment or to 
a different firm, other temporary contract at the same firm and a conversion from a temporary to 
a permanent contract at the same firm. The definition of a temporary contract is a relevant issue. 
Guell and Petrongolo (2007) and Booth, Francesconni and Frank (2002) use a broad definition 
of a temporary contract
25. We follow the same approach by considering temporary contracts the 
following categories: fixed term, specific task, training, and contract for circumstances of 
production, internship contract and replacement. With respect to the unemployment state we 
define two types of transitions depending on the type of contract at the new job: exit to a 
temporary contract and exit to a permanent contract. 
Given our sample selection criteria we end up with 472.406 and 585.602 unemployment spells 
and with 299.841 and 437.262 spells of temporary contracts for women and men, respectively. 
Sample size and main sample characteristics by gender for unemployed and temporary workers 
are displayed in Tables 4-0. Firstly, we can observe that the entrance probability into a 
permanent contract is pretty low in all cases. For instance, in Tables 3 and 4 we display the 
transition rates to permanent contracts by regions, age and gender. These transition rates ratify 
the high turnover level that characterises the behaviour of the labour market for the Spanish 
economy independently of the age, gender and region of the worker. We can observe that the 
main destination state after unemployment is a temporary contract. Meanwhile, after a 
temporary contract the most probable option is to exit to unemployment or to other firm. Thus, 
the probability of accessing into a permanent contract is only around 13% and 11% for 
unemployed women and men, respectively. The conversion probability from a temporary to a 
permanent contract is much lower: 1.2% for women and 0.9% for men. Interestingly, the 
conversion rate to a permanent contract is slightly higher for women. Since regional wage 
subsidies tend to be larger for women –as we will show later on-, we can wonder whether these 
differences by gender can be related to these regional policies. Moreover, there are also some 
differences by age groups. For instance, young workers have more chances to enter into a 
                                                 
24 We are not considering employment spell durations lower than 30 days in order not to study just very short spells due to 
reallocation or strong turnover within the firm. In this case the majority of the contracts are in fact signed through a temporary help 
agency. Given the interest of this research, we have opted to omit this type of spells. One can assume that they are really of 
temporary nature and therefore they should be independent of the policies committed to promote permanent employment.  








permanent contract from unemployment while the conversion rate of temporary contracts is 
larger for older workers. Thus, the transition rates to permanent contract from unemployment 
are 14% and 12% for female and male young workers, respectively. The conversion rates from a 
temporary contract are 1.5% and 1.1% for older workers.  
Regional transition rates are displayed in Table 4. They show the existence of an important 
variability of transition rates across Spanish regions. For instance, we have regions such as 
Madrid, la Rioja or Catalunya whose transition rates almost double the ones found for 
Andalusia and Extremadura. When we relate this information with the intensity of regional 
wage subsidies we can observe that there is not a clear relationship between these two variables.  
In Tables 5 and 6 we display the main sample characteristics for unemployed and temporary 
workers. They indicate that there are differences in the entrance probability into a permanent 
contract by personal characteristics. Among unemployed workers those low qualified, 
immigrants, and workers in the construction sector show lower probabilities of entering into a 
permanent contract. When a worker is in a temporary contract the probability of getting a 
permanent one in the same firm is also lower for low qualified and part-time workers, 
immigrants, and workers in the construction and services sector.  
In Tables 7 and 0 we show the relation between the type of transition and the duration of the 
unemployment spell, in the first case and the duration of the temporary contract, in the second 
one. The information shown in both tables put forward again the existence of a high turnover 
rate in the Spanish labor market during the analyzed period. With respect to unemployment 
duration we can observe that more than 70% of the sample consists of unemployment spells 
shorter than six months. The spells that end up into a temporary contract tend to have shorter 
durations than those spells ending up into a permanent one. In relation to the duration of the 
temporary contract we again observe that the sample is mainly composed by short-term 
temporary contracts. More than 60% of them lengthen less than six months, independently of 
the following state. We also observe that the probability of having another temporary contract at 
the same firm is larger for short-term contracts than for the long-term ones. On the contrary, the 
conversion probability from a temporary to a permanent contract is more common for lengthier 
ones.     
We display in Figures 1 and 02 the entrance probability to a permanent contract from 
unemployment and from a temporary contract at the same firm, respectively. In Figures 3, 4 and 
5 we represent the exit probability from unemployment to a temporary contract, from a 
temporary contract to unemployment and from a temporary contract to other temporary contract 
at the same firm, respectively. All figures are represented by gender and refer to the sample 
period 1994-2004. These figures illustrate our identification strategy. The first remarkably fact 
is that the entrance probability to a permanent contract from unemployment (Figure 1) and the 
conversion rate from a temporary to a permanent contract (Figure 02) increase during the period 
1998-2001. Moreover, in both cases this tendency seems to be negatively correlated with the 








from other temporary contract at the same firm (Figure 4). From Figure 3 we can observe that 
the exit probability from unemployment to a temporary contract shows a lower growth rate 
during this same period. In Figures 4 and 5 we show that the probability of accumulating 
temporary contracts at the same firm and the exit probability from a temporary contract to 
unemployment or to a different firm also decrease during the period 1998-2001. Evidently, this 
increasing trend in the entrance probability to a permanent contract should be related with the 
economic expansion that began in 1995 but it is also relevant to note that in 1997 there was an 
important labour market reform and national and regional active labour market policies to foster 
permanent contracts began.  
As complementary information of previous figures, we display in Table 9 the main sample 
entrance probabilities to new permanent contracts for treated and non-treated workers before 
and after 1997. Given the characteristics of the policy we are analysing, we can not define 
properly the periods before and after the treatment as it is common in policy evaluation. 
Nevertheless, we find interesting to highlight the differences in entrance probability to new 
permanent contracts by labour state before and after 1997 between treated and non-treated 
workers. We can observe that treated workers show an increase in the entrance probability to 
new permanent contracts except for old women and young men unemployed workers and male 
workers with a temporary contract. Meanwhile, all non-treated workers show a decrease in this 
probability. In the last column of Table 9 we display the empirical counterpart of the difference-
in-differences estimator. From these numbers we can say that the entrance probability to a 
permanent contract of treated workers relative to the one of non-treated workers increased after 
1997. The percentage change in the transition probability to a permanent contract is clearly 
larger when workers are in a temporary contract. It is also notably larger for women, 
independently of the initial labour state.  
When we look at the conversion rate from temporary to permanent contract we observe that 
young and older women experience the largest increase. When we look at unemployed workers, 
young and middle age women seem to be more benefited, especially the young ones. We 
consider that the results displayed in this table are highly interesting since they could be 
capturing the effect of the regional wage subsidies. The labour market reform of 1997 
established general discounts in payroll taxes for any new permanent contracts and introduced a 
new permanent contract for certain group of workers. As it has been stated by Kugler et al 
(2003) this reform mainly affected to male young workers
26. Therefore, the differences found in 
the diff-and-diff statistic shown in Table 9 can not be exclusively related to national labour 
market reforms and they might be related to the regional wage subsidies. Specially, the 
differences found between female and male young workers.  
                                                 








6  Results: The incidence of wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent 
contract 
In this section we deal with the incidence of regional wage subsidies over the transition rate to a 
permanent contract from unemployment and the conversion rate from a temporary to a 
permanent contract at the same firm. Moreover, since theses regional policies might give rise to 
substitution effects between different types of workers we also study whether these regional 
policies affect the exit rate from permanent employment.  
Our policy variable measures the maximum amount of the wage subsidy for each eligible 
individual
27. Furthermore, we introduce the exact amount of the subsidy and its square term in 
order to capture any nonlinear pattern in the treatment effect. With this specification we can 
check whether the wage subsidy fosters permanent contracts and whether the amount of the 
wage subsidy is relevant to explain its effect. We have shown that wage subsidies are larger for 
women and young workers and therefore, we could expect that the impact onto the entrance 
probability to a permanent contract will be larger for them. Moreover, we argue that with this 
specification we can take advantage of the additional variation in the quantities, even within 
eligible individual groups, along time and across regions to estimate the response of eligible 
individuals to the change in incentives.   
The sample used in the estimation includes workers aged 18-64 years. In all cases, we also split 
the whole sample by gender in order to gain homogeneity between treated and non-treated 
individuals. Besides, we allow for heterogeneous treatment effects by age and we model the 
policy variable as an interaction term between the maximum of the wage subsidy and the age 
group the worker belongs. We build three age groups: younger than 30 years old, aged between 
30 and 45, older than 45 years old. This distinction is also relevant since wage subsidies tend to 
vary by age. The duration dependence of the exit probability is specified as a polynomial in the 
log of the corresponding duration. Our specification also includes many personal and labor 
characteristics to control for differences between treated and non treated individuals that could 
affect the outcome under study. Hence, qualification category, firm size, firm age, full time job, 
sector of activity, private ownership, temporary help agency and whether the new contract is in 
the same firm as in the following one. We also consider variables that control for national and 
region-specific time trends. In this way we provide reassurance that our coefficients are not 
reflecting smoothly trending omitted variables that are potentially correlated with the adoption 
of regional wage subsidies. The variables considered are the regional unemployment rate and 
the national production growth rate. We also include a set of dummy variables that reflects the 
age group of the worker described above and we interact them with the national production 
growth rate and with the regional unemployment rate to control for age-specific different time 
                                                 
27 Initially, we have estimated other version of equation (1) where the variable Dijt was a binary variable being equal to one for those 
workers potentially treated in the corresponding year and region. We got that the policy variable was statistically significant but that 
the incidence was pretty low. Nevertheless, this model can offer incomplete information. This could arise for two main reasons. 
Firstly, one can argue that the labor demand by type of contract is highly inelastic to wage subsidies. This situation can arise when 
jobs covered by fixed-term contracts are in fact of temporary nature. Secondly, it could be that the amount of the wage subsidy does 








varying effects. In this way we introduce a control for asymmetric cyclical effects by age 
groups
28.  
Since we are estimating a competing risk model for each duration model, we obtain a specific 
vector of parameters for each alternative. Moreover, each duration model is estimated by gender 
and with and without control for unobserved heterogeneity. We also estimate different 
specifications of each model in order to check for the robustness of the results. For ease of 
exposition, we have opted not to present all the results but just the most relevant ones. Since we 
did not find relevant differences on the policy parameter between the model with and without 
unobserved heterogeneity we show the results of the first case. 
29 
6.1  The Conversion Rate from a Temporary to a Permanent Contract 
For the sample of workers with a temporary contract, wage subsidies only exist for the 
conversion of this contract into a permanent one at the same firm. This restriction has three 
main implications in the analysis. Firstly, the definition of the competing alternatives in our 
duration model differs slightly from the one of unemployed workers. In this context, the 
competing alternatives are, first, a new temporary contract with the same employer, second, a 
permanent contract with the same employer and, third, unemployment or other contract with a 
different employer. We have matched the alternative of unemployment with that of a direct 
transition to a different firm since we could assume that workers who change firm stay at least 
one day unemployed. For ease of exposition, from now we will name this last alternative as exit 
to unemployment. Secondly, workers directly hired by a Temporary Help Agency can not be 
benefited from this policy unless they become unemployed. Therefore, to get a closer definition 
of a potentially treated worker we have estimated the model without considering those 
temporary workers hired through a Temporary Help Agency
30. Thirdly, we drop those 
employment spells shorter than a month. The idea is that very short-term temporary contracts 
will probably be jobs of temporary nature and therefore they will be highly inelastic to any 
subsidy to convert it into a permanent one. This restriction makes sense in this analysis given 
that the final aim of these regional wage subsidies is to reduce the use of temporary contracts for 
permanent tasks
31.  
                                                 
28 A better way to control for age-specific cyclical effects in our evaluation exercise is to compare the transition probabilities of 
treated and control workers during the analysed period with these transition probabilities during an earlier period with similar 
cyclical behaviour. Nevertheless, we do not apply this approach since in our database we can not identify properly the type of the 
contract before the year 1995. Moreover, given that our analysis is based on regions affected by common macroeconomic shocks, 
we can assume that age-specific cyclical effects can be controlled by taking into account regional variability.  
29 Anyway those results not presented will be provided upon request. 
30 This restriction does not mean that these workers are kept out of the analysis. They will be included in the sample of unemployed 
workers.  
31 There are a few number of empirical studies that show that many Spanish firms use temporary contracts to fill permanent jobs 








The duration dependence of the exit probability from a temporary contract is specified as a 
polynomial in the log of the duration of the temporary contract. Besides we build some dummy 
variables that control for specific contract durations: less than 4, 6, 12, 24, and 36 months
32.  
We present the general results in Table 10. The first idea to highlight is that on average, the 
policy variable and the rest of “D” covariates are statistically significant and differ between 
alternatives. This result supports the interest to specify a competing risk model to correctly 
identify the effect of the wage subsidy over the conversion rate to a permanent contract relative 
to each of the competing alternatives. For instance, given the competing alternatives defined, we 
can check whether wage subsidies also affect the transition between temporary contracts at the 
same firm. It could be possible that the effect over the conversion rate to a permanent contract is 
low since the firms might find profitable to exhaust legal limits before using the subsidy to 
convert this contract into a permanent one. Besides, since the rest of “D” variables are 
statistically significant, our results put forward the fact that there are permanent and time 
varying differences among eligible workers and regions that must be controlled for in order to 
get an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the policy. The variable Dij is not separately 
identified from Dj in the case of women since regional wage subsidies tend to be generally 
addressed to this group. The rest of variables that control for permanent and time varying 
differential effects by age groups are also statistically significant. For instance, we can observe 
it is convenient to control for differences in the effects of the economic cycle by age group.  
We obtain that there is a non linear relationship between the exit rate from a temporary contract 
and the wage subsidy but this relation differs among alternatives and by worker characteristics. 
For ease of exposition we show in Table 11 a summary of the main results. This summary 
includes the odd ratio, the total marginal effect
33 of wage subsidies and the total change in the 
exit probability when the wage subsidy moves up from zero to 5100 Euros (which is the average 
wage subsidy). The main problem of computing marginal effects in multinomial logit models is 
that they can change sign depending on where the independent variables are being evaluated. 
Thus, we also display the odd ratios because they offer an easy summary of the main effects of 
wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a permanent contract for treated workers relative 
to the non-treated ones.  
The estimated marginal effects of wage subsidies show that the exit rate from a temporary 
contract to unemployment tends to decrease for treated workers. The effect is statistically 
significant for all workers. The fall is slightly larger for women and it ranges from –0.32% for 
old men to –1.51% for young women when measured at the average subsidy. The total change 
in this exit probability is negative for treated workers except for old workers and middle age 
men. Female and male old treated workers might experience a small increase in their exit 
probability to unemployment of around 1.21% and 1.17% respectively. This increase is lower 
                                                 
32 The empirical hazard shows a spike at these specifics durations. 
33 The total marginal effect implies that we are taking into account any non-linear relationship between wage subsidies and the 








for middle age men workers
34, 0.48%. On the contrary, the exit probability to unemployment 
experiences a larger drop for young workers (8.07% and 3.11% for female and male workers, 
respectively) and middle age women (6.34%).  
The marginal effect of wage subsidies over the exit probability to other temporary contract at 
the same firm is larger –in absolute terms- that the marginal effect on the exit rate to 
unemployment. Moreover, it is statistically significant in all cases. As before, the marginal 
effect is slightly larger for women. It varies from 1.22% for young men to 5.10% for old 
women. Consequently, the total change in the transition probability to new temporary contracts 
at the same firm is always positive and much larger than the one found for the exit rate to 
unemployment. It is also interesting to note that this growth in the transition probability of 
accumulating temporary contracts at the same firm tends to increase with age. For instance, the 
estimated exit probability to a temporary contract as the wage subsidy growths to 5100 Euros, 
increases by 16.08%, 16.18% and 23.53% for young, middle age and old women, respectively. 
In the case of men, the total change in this exit probability is lower except for middle age men. 
These changes are 2.42%, 17.42% and 14.79% for young, middle age and old men, respectively.  
The marginal effects of wage subsidies over the transition rate to a permanent contract show 
important differences among workers. They are only statistically significant at 90% of 
confidence for women and middle age male workers. Nevertheless, when it is statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the effect is larger than the one found for the other exits. The 
marginal change in the conversion probability to a permanent contract is the largest for young 
women and middle age male workers (6.68% and 4.45%, respectively). Consequently, the total 
change in the exit probability to a permanent contract is larger for these two groups of workers, 
26.26% for young women and 22.40% for middle age men. On the contrary, the marginal effect 
is low for middle age women, 1.99% and it is even negative for old women, -0.69%. 
Nevertheless, the total variation in the conversion probability to a permanent contract is not low 
for them, around 23.59% and 11.48% for middle age and old women, respectively. This is due 
to the fact that the marginal effect of wage subsidies for these workers is larger for lower levels 
of the subsidy
35. Nevertheless, since the transition rates to permanent contracts at the same firm 
are pretty low these relative changes hardly generate a change in the transition probability from 
a temporary to a permanent contract at the same firm. For instance, in the case of young women 
the estimated transition probability growths from 0.064% to 0.075% while for middle age men 
it changes from 0.039% to 0.041%. 
It is also interesting to note that the marginal change for women keeps increasing with the level 
of the wage subsidy. For instance, the marginal effect is 7.68% for a wage subsidy of 10.000 
euros for young women and around 4% for middle age and old women. On the contrary, the 
marginal effect states at around 4.4% for middle men at 5.100 euros and around 4% at 10.000 
                                                 
34 Though the marginal effect at the average wage subsidy is negative for middle age workers, the total change in probability is 
positive since the marginal effect is negative for lower amounts of the wage subsidy.  








euros. Therefore, there seem to be room for fostering the transition rates to permanent contract 
for women by increasing the wage subsidy.   
Finally, the effects of wage subsidies over the mean duration at the temporary contract are also 
low though statistically significant in all cases. They are also larger for women. The estimated 
mean duration of the temporary contract increases from 13 to 16 months for young and middle 
age women and from 13 to 15 for old women. The estimated mean duration of the temporary 
contract for men states around 13 months.  
The information provided by the odd ratios leads us to the same ideas. Their interest rest on that 
they offer a summary of the net effects of wage subsidies over the entrance probability to a 
permanent contract for treated workers. The probability of getting a permanent contract relative 
to exiting to unemployment for treated workers increases in all cases except for old male 
workers. These odd ratios are larger for young and middle age women, 27.4% and 22.4% 
respectively, and middle age men, 21.8%. On the contrary, the odd ratio of getting a permanent 
contract relative to exiting to a new temporary contract at the same firm is positive but small for 
young women and middle age men or negative for the rest of workers. Therefore, wage 
subsidies seem to reduce the incidence of unemployment for treated workers while the 
incidence of new temporary contracts at the same firm is not clearly lower and in fact it might 
increase for certain type of workers as it seems to be the case for old male workers. The odd 
ratios relative to staying at the same temporary contract are also positive in all cases except for 
old middle age men. Again the magnitude of the odd ratios is larger for young and middle age 
women and for middle age men. Therefore, the analysis of the odd ratio also points that wage 
subsidies foster the permanence of workers at the same firm partially by accumulating 
temporary contracts while it hardly increases the duration of the temporary contract itself.   
In order to value the importance of the effect of wage subsidies over the entrance probability to 
a permanent contract we also must consider which is the discount received by firms in terms of 
their labor costs. A wage subsidy of 5100 euros implies a drop of the monthly average wage
36 of 
25.3% if we consider that the worker stays one year with the permanent contract and around 
12.6% if we consider that the workers remains two years with a permanent contract at the 
firm
37. Evidently, as the duration of the contract increases the discount these subsidies imply 
over monthly labor costs decreases. At the same time, total labor costs increases with tenure –
dismissal costs mainly-. Hence, the computation of an elasticity of labor demand for permanent 
contracts relative to the wage subsidy is not straightforward. If we take the one year discount 
obtained by the firm we would conclude that the demand for new permanent contract is not 
sensitive to wage subsidies except for young women and middle age workers. Only for this 
group of workers, the discount guaranteed by the wage subsidy makes firms to increase their 
demand of permanent contracts. 
                                                 
36 The monthly average labour cost is 1.681 Euros and is taken from the Labour Costs Survey published by INE for the year 2000.  
37 Since wage subsidies are designed to foster stability on employment we consider that the desired permanence on employment 
should be at least two years. Besides, in many cases, wage subsidies are conditioned to keep the worker for a period of non shorter 








Since this low elasticity of the demand to new permanent contracts could be related with the 
temporary nature of the job we have also estimated the model restricting the sample to workers 
with temporary contracts of more than three months. Tough, there are not relevant differences; 
we find interesting to point out that the marginal effects are slightly smaller. Consequently, we 
can not conclude that the low elasticity of labor demand for new temporary contracts is due to 
the temporary nature of the jobs covered by temporary contracts. Finally, we also estimated the 
model for workers hired only by private firms. Previous empirical research has shown that the 
increasing trend in the rate of temporary contracts is due to the increasing use of these contracts 
from the public sector, mainly local agents (Dolado, García-Serrano, and Jimeno, 2002). Again 
the results obtained for the policy variables are pretty similar and therefore we do not find 
evidence of differences between treated workers in private or public firms. 
6.2  The Transition Rate from Unemployment to a Permanent Contract 
For the case of unemployed workers we have also imposed one sample restriction and we focus 
on workers with unemployment spells no lengthier than one year. This sample restriction is 
made in order to gain homogeneity for treated workers. The policy we are evaluating is not 
designed to foster employment for disadvantaged unemployed workers as the long-term 
unemployed ones. Besides, since 1994 there are many national and regional ALMPs addressed 
basically to foster the employment of long-term unemployed workers and we want to analyze 
the effect of wage subsidies without any other ALMP influence, we exclude long-term 
unemployed. 
As before, the duration dependence of the exit probability is specified as a polynomial in the log 
of the spell duration. The control variables differ slightly. Specifically, we omit some variables 
related to previous job characteristics and we add two variables that identify whether the worker 
is eligible for unemployment benefits and whether she receives them when she exits from 
unemployment. We also use as a regressor whether the worker was previously hired by a 
temporary help agency and whether he returns to the same firm.  
In Table 12 we present the general results of estimating the competing risk model for 
unemployed by gender when the policy variable is the maximum amount of the wage subsidy 
for each eligible worker. From this table we can observe that the policy variable and the rest of 
“D” variables are statistically significant in most of the cases and differ between alternatives. 
This leads us to conclude that it is important to control for permanent differences between 
eligible workers and treated regions to get an unbiased estimate of the policy. Besides, we also 
can observe that aggregate and regional cyclical effects impact differently into the exit rate from 
unemployment by age group.   
In Table 13 we have the predicted treatment effects by age and gender in terms of the odd ratios 
of exiting to a permanent contract relative to the other two competing alternatives. With this 
analysis we can get a clearer idea of the net effects of wage subsidies over the entrance 








effect of the policy computed at the average wage subsidy and the total change in the 
probability. The first result to highlight is that the effect of wage subsidies over the entrance 
probability to a permanent contract for unemployed workers is notable lower than the one found 
for workers with a temporary contract.  
The marginal effects of wage subsidies over the exit rate from unemployment to a temporary 
contract are negative for young workers and positive for the rest. But in any case, the values are 
pretty small and only for old men it reaches the magnitude of 1%. Thus, when we compute the 
total change in the exit probability from unemployment to a temporary contract as a result of the 
policy it gives small changes as they range from 0.16% for young women to 6.27% for old 
women
38. It is interesting to note that old women it seems that wage subsidies could benefit 
them indirectly. That is, wage subsidies seem to increase their exit rate from unemployment to a 
temporary contract and, as we have shown in previous section, they favor their accumulation of 
temporary contracts at the same firm. The question that remains is whether they finally enter 
into a permanent contract or not.   
To measure the direct effect of wage subsidies for unemployed workers we must look at the 
effects of wage subsidies over the exit rate from unemployment to a permanent contract. We can 
observe in Table 13 that the marginal effect measured at the average wage subsidy is 
statistically significant for all workers except for old men. They all are positive and larger for 
women, but in all cases they are quite small. For women, they range from 2.26% -old workers-, 
to 2.55% -young ones-. Meanwhile, this marginal effect for men varies from 0.22% –old 
workers-, to 2.38% -young workers-. In terms of the total change in the exit probability due to 
wage subsidies, the biggest impact is among young workers. Female and male young workers 
experience an increase in the entrance probability to a permanent contract of 14.97% and 
14.40%. For middle age workers this change is 8.36% for men and 6.46% for women.  
Finally, the marginal effects of wage subsidies over the probability of staying unemployed are 
statistically significant but irrelevant since they all are smaller than 0.5%. Equivalently, the total 
change in the probability of staying unemployed is pretty small. Therefore, we do not find 
evidence that wage subsidies accelerate the exit from unemployment for treated workers. The 
estimated mean duration of unemployment states around 7 months for men and 6 months for 
women.   
The information provided by the odd ratios leads us to the same ideas pointed out so far. Firstly, 
the impact of wage subsidies is lower for unemployed workers than for temporary ones since 
the odd ratios are smaller than the ones found for temporary workers. Secondly, the larger 
incidence of wage subsidies is for young unemployed workers and middle age unemployed 
males.   
To check the robustness of the results we have made two additional estimations. Firstly, we 
have included all unemployed workers. Secondly, we have restricted the analysis to workers 
                                                 
38 The fact that the marginal effects are negative for young workers though the total change in the exit probability to a temporary 








with temporary contracts in the previous job. In both cases the results do not differ strongly. In 
the first case, as expected, the odd ratios are even smaller. In the second case, they are slightly 
larger.  
6.3  Testing for Substitution Effects: The Exist Rate from Permanent Employment  
We are also concerned with the possible existence of substitution effects. Substitution effects 
occur if participants take some of the jobs that non-participants would have got in absence of 
the treatment. The wage subsidy can affect the individual probability of having a permanent 
contract in two ways. First, the firm that hires an eligible individual receives a wage subsidy 
when signing a new permanent contract that may enhance the worker’s probability of having a 
permanent contract. Second, some of the individuals who are not eligible might faced a drop in 
this probability. In this situation we would say that in average terms the policy has no effects 
when in reality it has. The extent to which this may happen will depend on some different 
factors. If the wage subsidy just covers the deficit in productivity of unemployed or temporary 
workers we would not expect any substitution effect. The eligible workers are no cheaper than 
anyone else. Second, it will depend on the extent that these workers are substitutable in 
production for the existing ones and on the extent that it is easy to churn workers, that is, to 
replace a worker finishing a permanent contract with a new subsidized worker. This latter point 
is important when the wage subsidy does not require keeping the worker for several years. Of 
course, if new permanent contracts are generally short, firms will be able to use subsidized 
workers instead of non-subsidized ones, without extra effort. For instance, Cebrian and Toharia 
(2005) offer some evidence that this might have happened. 
To estimate the exit rate from permanent employment we follow the same approach applied in 
previous section. We estimate a competing risk model for workers with a permanent contract 
and considering they face the following alternatives: staying at the same contract, exiting to 
unemployment, to a temporary contract and to other permanent contract. In terms of our 
duration model, if wage subsidies generate important substitution effects we should observe an 
increase of the exit rate to unemployment or to a temporary contract, for non-treated workers. In 
Table 14 we display the results for these transitions. We can observe that the policy variable is 
statistically significant for young and middle-age workers while for old workers is only 
marginally significant for one of the alternatives considered. This last result is expected as we 
previously have shown that the policy has not significant effects for this group of workers, 
either when they are in a temporary contract or unemployed.  
In Table 15 we display a summary of our main results by computing the odd ratio of staying at 
the permanent contract relative to the rest of alternatives and the marginal and total effect of the 
wage subsidies. In this model, and given the way we have defined the odd ratios, the 
information provided by the total marginal effect is equivalent to the one provided by the odd 








The first idea to highlight is that we find some evidence of substitution effect. The marginal 
effects of wage subsidies over the exit probability to unemployment are statistically significant 
in all cases, nevertheless, they are relevant only in the case of women since the marginal effects 
for men are just close to 1%. The marginal effects measured at the average wage subsidy 
decrease with age and they are 3.26%, -5.36% and –14.24%, for young, middle age and old 
workers, respectively. However, the total change in the probability is negative, in any case, and 
takes the following values: –20.45%, -7.71% and –2.58 for young, middle age and old workers, 
respectively. The result found for young workers is due to the fact that the incidence of wage 
subsidies over the exit rate to unemployment is negative for lower levels of the wage subsidy
39. 
Hence, we obtain that if wage subsidies foster substitution effects they concentrate on young 
female workers. Given that young female workers are also the most benefit ones, this result 
imply that wage subsidies favor the substitution of non-eligible young women with permanent 
contracts for eligible ones. 
The marginal effect of wage subsidies over the exit probability to a temporary contract is 
significantly lower than the one found for the unemployment exit rate. As before, there are 
interesting differences by gender. Though the marginal effects are all positive, the total change 
in the probability is negative for men while positive for middle age and old women. The total 
change in probability for young women is negative but very small. Therefore, it seems that 
treated women face an increase in their probability to move from a permanent to a temporary 
contract while the opposite is found for treated men since they experience a drop in this 
probability. However, the magnitude of the effects is not large in any case. They are 9.63% and 
14.97% for middle age and old women, respectively and –8.15%, -19.67% and –14.43% for 
young, middle age and old male workers.  
The most interesting results rise when we look at the exit probability to other permanent 
contract. The marginal effects and the total change in the probability are especially relevant for 
women. The marginal effects are large and positive for this group and consequently, the total 
change in the exit probability to a permanent contract is also large. These relative changes are: 
57.57%, 95.19% and 67.53% for young, middle age and old women. For men they are notably 
lower for middle age and old men (3.48% and 3.33%, respectively), and even negative for 
young workers. Hence, these results point out that wage subsidies favor the transition between 
permanent contracts for treated women.  
Finally the effects of wage subsidies over the mean duration at the permanent contract are all 
statistically significant and negative. As the consequence of wage subsidies, the estimated 
average duration at the permanent contract increases for young workers from 96 to 113 months 
for women and from 116 to 120 for men. For middle age workers it also increases but in a lower 
extend since it varies from 96 to 97 months for women and 116 to 119 for men. Finally, the 
estimated average duration decreases for old workers from 96 to 94 for women and from 116 to 
112 for men.  
                                                 








7  Conclusions 
Spain is one of the countries with the highest rate of temporary contracts in Europe and this 
might bring negative costs for the economy both in terms of efficiency and equity conditions. 
Thus, national and regional governments have designed different policies to foster the creation 
of permanent employment. Since the 1997 labor reform, the national government offered 
discounts in payroll taxes for new permanent contracts. Simultaneously, since 1997, different 
regional governments have begun to encourage permanent employment by offering wage 
subsidies to new permanent contracts for certain type of workers, in some cases, and for all 
workers in others. 
In this paper we use the information of these regional policies to measure the impact of wage 
subsidies on the creation of permanent employment. We take advantage from all the variability 
derived from these regional policies, that is, regional, time and individual eligibility criteria, to 
identify the treatment effect. We apply a Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences (DDD) 
approach to estimate the effects of regional wage subsidies over the probability of getting a 
permanent contract. With this approach we control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
between control and treatment groups. To check the robustness of the results and in order to 
gain homogeneity between treated and non-treated individuals, we also estimate the model 
splitting the whole sample by gender.  
We estimate the incidence of regional wage subsidies over the transition rate to a permanent 
employment from a temporary contract and from unemployment using as a policy variable the 
maximum amount of the wage subsidy for an eligible individual. Besides, in order to check for 
substitutions effects we estimate the exit probability from a permanent contract. In all cases we 
follow a competing risk approach.  
From our main results, we can conclude that the policy of subsidizing new permanent contracts 
shows a positive effect over the transition rate to a permanent job only for certain groups of 
treated workers. Though, there are several differences by the initial labor state, by gender and 
age we can conclude that, in general, the effect is small. Old workers are clearly not affected by 
wage subsidies. On the contrary, young workers, especially women, are the most benefited ones 
followed by middle-age workers. Young male workers seem to be benefited only when they are 
unemployed.  Nevertheless, the quantitative effects of these wage subsidies are pretty low and it 
seems that the elasticity of the demand for new permanent contracts relative to wage subsidies 
tends to be lower than one, even for young female workers. For instance, the average wage 
subsidy implies a drop of around 25% in total labor costs for a one year contract. The 
conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts for treated workers increases between 
22-26% for young females and middle age workers. The transition rate from unemployment to a 
permanent contract increases only by 14% for young workers and between 6%-8% for middle 
age workers. Given that the empirical transition probability to a permanent contract is pretty 








Wage subsidies might increase the total duration of the employment spell at the same firm for 
treated workers and mainly for women through the accumulation of new temporary contracts. 
This statement comes from the fact that treated workers with a temporary contract get a drop in 
the exit probability to unemployment and more importantly, an increase in the exit probability 
to a temporary contract in the same firm. Specially relevant seem to be this result for the case of 
old women since we obtain that the transition probability to a temporary contract increases by 
23,5%. Given these results, we could argue that firms might use wage subsidies to convert 
temporary contracts into permanent ones after the worker has spent a certain amount of time at 
the firm through several temporary contracts
40.  
The results match the theoretical predictions since wage subsidies only imply a temporary drop 
in hiring costs and it maintains the large existing differences in total labor costs between 
temporary and permanent contracts. The results found are also similar to the ones presented in 
Kugler et al (2003) who analyses the effect of discounts on payroll taxes implemented in the 
1997 reform on to the transition rate to new permanent contracts. They find that the elasticity of 
labor demand relative to non-wage labor costs is lower than one and larger for young workers. 
Finally we have estimated whether wage subsidies generate any substitution effect between 
eligible and non-eligible workers. The results obtained do not support the idea that this policy 
increases the exit rate from permanent contract in the case of non-treated men and women, 
except for young women. In this last case, we obtain that wage subsidies increases the transition 
to unemployment of non-treated female workers. Interestingly, we obtain that wage subsidies 
increase the transition rate between permanent contracts for women, especially for middle age 
ones. This last result evidences the fact already put forward in Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) 
model commented in section 2. The idea is that a hiring subsidy stimulates job creation, 
however once the job is created, the opportunity cost of maintaining the match rises since the 
hiring subsidy can again be obtained when creating a new job. Recall that the labor market 
reform of 1997 created a new permanent contract with lower dismissal costs and this contract 
was addressed to certain group of workers included women. Besides, this group was also 
elected to receive larger discounts in payroll taxes for new permanent contracts.  
                                                 
40 Rebollo (2006) shows that for certain type of workers temporary contracts might be a stepping-stone to a permanent one but once 
the worker has accumulated several temporary contracts. Guell (2000) shows that Spanish firms tend to exhaust legal limits before 









Anderson, P. And Meyer, B. (1997): “The Effects of Firm Specific Taxes and Government 
Mandates with an Application to the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Programme”, Journal of 
Public Economics, 65(2), pp 119-145. 
Besley, T. and Case, A. (2000): “Unnatural Experiment? Estimating the Incidence of 
Endogenous Policies”, The Economic Journal, 110, pp. 672-694. 
Blanchard, O. and Landier, A. (2002): “The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: 
Fixed-Term Contracts in France” The Economic Journal, 112 (June), pp. 214-244. 
Blundell, R. and MaCurdy, T. (1999): “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches,” in 
Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics 3 (North-Holland, 
1999). 
Booth, A. Francesconi, M. and Frank, J. (2002): “Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead 
Ends?”.  The Economic Journal, 112 (June), pp. 183-213. 
Calmfors, L. (1994): “Active labor market policies and unemployment: a framework for the 
analysis of crucial desing features”, OECD Economic Studies, 22, pp. 7-49. 
Casquel, C. and Cunyat, A. (2004): “The causes and consequences of Temporary Jobs in Spain: 
a Theoretical-Empirical Approach”, Working Papers Serie EC 2004-18, Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas. 
Cebrián, I. and Toharia, L. (2005): “Are Spanish Open-Ended Contracts Permanents? Duration 
and trajectory analyses”, mimeo. 
Cipollone, P. and Guelfi, A. (2003): “Tax credit policy and firm´s behaviour: the case of 
subsidies to open-end labor contracts in Italy”, Working Paper, Bank of Italy, Economic 
Research Department, Nº 471. 
Dolado, J., García-Serrano, C. and Jimeno, J. (2002): “Drawing Lessons from the Boom of 
Temporary Jobs in Spain”. The Economic Journal, pp. 270-295. 
Dolado, J., Jansen M. and Jimeno, J. (2003): “Targeted Employment Policies and Partial Labour 
Market Reforms: Theory and Empirical Evidence” mimeo. 
García Pérez, J.I and Rebollo, Y. (2005): “Wage Mobility through Job Mobility: A Multinomial 
Endogenous Switching Approach”,  Labour Economics, Vol. 12, Issue 4, pp. 531-556. 
García Pérez, J.I and Rebollo, Y. (2006): “The use of permanent and temporary jobs across 
Spanish regions: Do unit labor costs differentials offer an explanation?” Moneda y Crédito, 223, 
pp. 85-125.  
Gruber, J. and Madrian, B.C., (1997): "Employment separation and health insurance coverage," 
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pp. 349-382. 
Güell, M. (2000): “Fixed Term Contracts and Unemployment: an Efficiency Wage Analysis”. 








Güell, M. and Petrolongo, B. (2007): “How Binding Are Legal Limits? Transitions from 
Temporary to Permanent Work in Spain”. Labour Economics, Vol 14(2), pp. 153-183. 
Hahn, J., Todd, P. and Van der Klaauw, W. (1999): “Identification and Estimation of Treatment 
Effects with Regression Discontinuity Design”, Working Paper, UNC, November. 
Heckman, J.J. y Singer, B. (1984): “The identifiably of the proportional hazard model”, Review 
of Economic Studies, 51, pp. 231-241. 
Katz, L.F. y Meyer, B.D (1990): “Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations and 
Unemployment Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 973-1002. 
Kugler, A. Jimeno, J.F. and Hernanz, V. (2003): “Employment Consequences of Restrictive 
Employment Policies: Evidence from Spanish Labor Market Reforms”, FEDEA, working paper, 
2003-14. 
Lubjova, M. and Van Ours, J.C. (1999): “Effects of active labour market programs on the 
transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs in the Slovak Republic”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 27, pp. 90-112. 
Martin, J.P. and Grubb, D. (2001): “What works and for whom: a review of OECD countries´ 
experiences with active labor market policies”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 8, pp. 9-56. 
Meyer, B. (1995): “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments in Economics” Journal of Business 
and Economic Studies”, XXII, pp. 151-162. 
Mortensen, D.T. and Pissarides, C.A. (2001): “Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium in Labor 
Market Outcomes”, CEPR Discussion Paper 2989. 
OCDE (2002): “Employment Outlook”, Paris. 
Rebollo, Y. (2006): “The role of job interruptions, temporary contracts and multi-firm 
experiences in the temporality trap in Spain”, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Economics 








List of Tables  
1. Table 1: Regional Wage Incentives to the creation of Permanent Contracts: Eligibility 
conditions by age and gender across Spanish Regions (1997-2004) 
 MALES  FEMALES 
Andalusia   all  ages  1997-2002   all  ages  1997-2002 
Aragon   40 or more  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Asturias   all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003   all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003 
Balearic Islands   NO     all ages  2000-2004 
Canary Islands   18-25  1.998   all ages  1.998 
   all ages  1.999   all ages  1.999 
Cantabria   all ages  1998, 2000-2004   all ages  1998, 2000-2004 
C. Leon   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
C. Mancha   16-30  1.998   all ages  1.998 
   16-29 & 45 or more  1999-2003   all ages  1999-2003 
Catalunya   NO     NO   
Valencia   all  ages 
1998-2001, 
2003-2004   all  ages  1998-2004 
Extremadura   all  ages 1997-2004    all  ages  1997-2004 
Galicia   18-30 & 45 or more  1998   all ages  1.998 
   all ages  1999-2004   all ages  1999-2004 
Madrid   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Murcia   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
Navarra NO   NO   
Basque Country   all ages 1998-2004    all  ages  1998-2004 
Rioja   all ages  1998-2004   all ages  1998-2004 
2. Table 2: Regional Incentives to the creation of Permanent Contracts 
Minimum Mean  Maximum  Mean/Total Costs* 
Regions  Andalusia 2.400 3.844 6.012 21.0% 
 Aragon  1.200 3.684 5.160 18.9% 
 Asturias  3.600 4.100 4.500 20.3% 
 Balearic  Islands    1.653 1.726 1.800 9.6% 
  Canary Islands   3.000 3.300 3.600 19.0% 
 Cantabria  1.803 3.604 4.808 19.1% 
 C.  Leon  1.800 3.605 5.115 21.0% 
 C.  Mancha  3.000 3.300 3.600 17.4% 
 Catalunya  0 0 0 0.0% 
 Valencia  1.800 4.513 7.466 24.8% 
 Extremadura  4.166 10.076 15.177 62.3% 
 Galicia  3.000 3.600 4.200 20.6% 
 Madrid  3.600 7.971 12.000 32.3% 
 Murcia  3.000 4.838 7.200 29.4% 
 Navarra  0 0 0 0.0% 
 Basque  Country  3.273 4.459 7.512 19.2% 
 Rioja  4.491 5.001 6.011 27.3% 
Gender  Males 1.200 4.764 15.177 - 
 Females  1.200 5.147 15.177 - 
Age  Aged 18-30  1.200 5.159 15.177 - 
 Aged  31-44  1.200 4.078 15.177 - 
 Aged  45-64  1.653 4.766 15.177 - 
To compute the last column we have taken total labor costs per year for each region from the 









3. Table 3: Exit probability by Age and Gender (Uncensored Observations) 
Unemployed 
    U. - P.C.    U. - T.C. 
   Women Men Women  Men 
Age <30  14.14%  12.39%  85.86%  87.61% 
Age 30-45  12.00%  9.66%  88.00%  90.34% 
Age >45  12.24%  9.30%  87.76%  90.70% 
Average 13.43%  11.33%  86.57%  88.67% 
Temporary Contract 
    T.C -P.C. Same Firm  T.C -T.C. Same Firm 
   Women Men Women  Men 
Age <30  1.13%  0.85%  6.21%  7.06% 
Age 30-45  1.22%  0.82%  8.97%  10.13% 
Age >45  1.53%  1.14%  9.36%  10.51% 
Average 1.19%  0.88%  7.32%  8.45% 
PC=Permanent Contract; TC=Temporary Contract  
4. Table 4: Exit Probability by Region and Gender (Uncensored Observations) 
  Unemployed Temporary  Contract 




   Women Men  Women  Men Women  Men 
Andalucia 9.87%  6.90%  8.68%  12.00%  1.20%  0.65% 
Aragon 12.75%  12.75%  8.33%  7.83%  1.21%  1.07% 
Asturias 11.18%  9.43%  7.49%  8.57%  1.17%  0.76% 
Baleares 15.45%  11.89%  2.67%  5.18%  0.73%  0.62% 
Canarias 14.17%  11.16%  5.35% 5.39% 1.13%  0.86% 
Cantabria 10.91%  9.85%  8.34%  9.19%  1.31%  1.16% 
Castilla-Mancha 10.72%  9.16% 8.52%  11.51%  1.07%  0.83% 
Castilla-León 12.02%  11.06%  7.47%  8.01%  1.06%  0.76% 
Cataluña 16.60%  15.13%  5.63%  5.78%  1.29%  1.07% 
C. Valenciana  12.92%  11.92% 7.44%  7.71% 1.31% 1.12% 
Extremadura 9.61%  8.13%  6.32%  10.41%  0.95%  0.67% 
Galicia  10.51%  10.76% 11.72% 10.51% 1.38% 0.81% 
Madrid 17.18%  15.63%  5.67%  7.41%  1.05%  0.78% 
Murcia 12.12%  11.23%  6.82%  6.7  1.26%  1.19% 
Navarra 13.63%  12.50%  9.62% 9.93% 1.58%  1.27% 
País Vasco  11.11%  11.30%  11.22% 11.08% 1.30% 1.24% 
Rioja 13.15%  13.26%  10.19%  9.95%  1.60%  1.81% 









5. Table 5: Main Sample Characteristics for Unemployed Workers by Gender  
 Women  Men 
  Censored  T.C P.C  Censored T.C P.C 
U.  Duration  13.4  5.3 5.8  11.9  4.8 5.4 
Age  31  29 29 32 30 29 
Temporary Employment Agency  6.1%  8.3% 7.6% 6.4%  10.0%  8.4% 
Equal Employer  -  37.7%  23.9  -  26.9%  17.5% 
High Qualification  6.3%  7.5% 6.1% 4.9% 2.8% 5.4% 
Medium-High Qualification  13.1%  14.1% 14.9%  9.5%  7.0%  11.7% 
Medium Qualification  31.3%  33.4% 37.0% 34.1% 32.7% 31.4% 
Medium-Low Qualification  49.1%  44.7% 41.9% 52.1% 57.3% 51.0% 
Inmigrant  3.5%  2.5% 3.2% 5.4% 5.7% 5.2% 
Part-time  40.4%  37.2% 48.7% 18.9% 15.8% 19.5% 
Industry  9.8%  9.8%  10.0% 12.1% 12.7% 17.6% 
Construction  2.9%  1.7%  1.7%  29.6% 34.6% 17.7% 
Services  86.4%  88.7% 87.5% 56.8% 52.6% 64.6% 
Unemployment Benefits (t=T)  20.0%  18.1% 22.1% 24.0% 23.9% 24.5% 
Unemployment Benefits  35.4%  27.0% 32.8% 36.5% 31.7% 33.9% 
Simple Size  61,961  350,018 60,697  63,826 458,307 63,472 
PC=Permanent Contract; TC=Temporary Contract 
6. Table 6: Main Sample Characteristics for Workers with a Temporary Contract by Gender  
 Women  Men 
 Censored 













T.C Duration  11.4  5.9  5.2  7.5  11.7  6.2 6.3 8.7 
Age  33  30  32  31  34 31 33 32 
Temporary Employment 
Agency  1.6%  3.3%  6.7%  0.0%  1.3% 3.1% 5.5% 0.0% 
Equal Employer  4.1%  32.0%  -  -  2.7%  21.3%  -  - 
High Qualification  18.7%  8.2%  10.3%  6.0%  8.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.6% 
Medium-High 
Qualification  14.5% 13.9% 12.6%  15.0%  8.9% 7.0% 4.6% 9.1% 
Medium  Qualification  28.4% 31.1% 25.8%  37.3%  40.7% 34.2% 40.3% 36.6% 
Medium-Low 
Qualification  37.4% 46.6% 51.7%  41.3%  41.8% 55.7% 52.1% 50.1% 
Inmigrant  5.2% 3.0% 1.6%  3.4%  9.0% 6.4% 4.4% 4.5% 
Part-time  35.6% 37.5% 28.2%  35.0%  11.0% 15.1% 13.1% 14.7% 
Industry 8.9%  9.4%  11.7%  19.4%  12.9% 12.2% 12.0% 32.3% 
Construction  3.6% 1.7% 0.7%  1.6%  40.1% 34.5% 35.5% 18.3% 
Services  87.0% 88.0% 87.4%  78.6%  46.0% 51.3% 51.5% 48.6% 
N 57,570  221,985  17,352  2,934  80,363 324,253 29,449  3,197 









7. Table 7: Temporary Contract Duration by Competing Alternatives 
Women Men     
T.C P.C T.C  P.C 
< 6 Months  75.4% 70.0% 78.3%  71.6% 
6-12 Months  14.9% 16.4% 14.1%  17.1% 
12-18 Months  5.2% 7.0% 4.4% 6.2% 
18-24 Months  2.8% 4.1% 2.1% 3.3% 
24-30 Months  1.8% 2.5% 1.2% 1.8% 
PC=Permanent Contract; TC=Temporary Contract 
 
8. Table 0: Temporary Contract Duration by Competing Alternatives 
 Women Men   
  










< 6 Months  72.3% 79.1%  64.9%  71.6%  81.5%  75.5% 
6-12 Months  21.7% 16.9%  25.0%  19.8%  12.9%  15.0% 
12-18 Months  3.1% 2.0%  5.4%  4.5%  2.1%  4.4% 
18-24 Months  1.5% 0.9%  2.4%  2.0%  1.4%  2.2% 
24-30 Months  0.5% 0.4%  1.2%  0.8%  0.7%  0.8% 
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6.   
9. Table 9:Empirical Entrance Probability to a Permanent Contract by labour states before 
and after the 1997 reform 





  Treated  Non-
Treated  Treated  Non-
Treated  Treated Non-Treated   
Unemployed 
Women 
Age <30  12.3  14.5  14.3  11.6  16%  -20%  181% 
Age 30-45  10.0  15.0  12.3  11.1  23%  -26%  188% 
Age >45  13.7  16.2  12.6  11.3  -8%  -30%  73% 
Men  
Age <30  12.4  15.3  12.1  9.8  -2%  -36%  93% 
Age 30-45  8.3  13.5  9.5  8.7  14%  -35%  141% 
Age >45  7.6  15.3  8.4  8.8  10%  -42%  125% 
Temporary Contract 
Women 
Age <30  1.00  0.83  1.12  0.65  12%  -22%  155% 
Age 30-45  1.05  1.60  1.10  0.63  5%  -61%  108% 
Age >45  0.88  1.43  0.98  0.84  115%  -41%   128% 
Men 
Age <30  0.90  0.90  0.82  0.47  -9%  -48%  81% 
Age 30-45  0.82  0.94  0.77  0.46  -6%  -51%  88% 










10.  Table 10: Competing Risk Duration Model by Gender (Initial State=Temporary 
Contract) 
  Women Men 
  U. T.C  P.C  U.  T.C  P.C 
  Coef.  sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd 
TC. Dur. (ln)  3.793  0.01 3.678 0.04 3.800 0.13 3.410 0.01 3.540 0.03 3.598 0.13 
TC. Dur. (ln)^2  -0.959  0.00 -0.988 0.02 -0.822 0.03 -0.867 0.00 -0.890 0.01 -0.731 0.03 
TC. Dur < 3 months  1.417  0.01 1.416 0.03 1.495 0.08 1.325 0.01 1.261 0.02 1.407 0.08 
Month 6 (T.C. Dur)  0.992  0.01 0.761 0.03 1.369 0.05 0.797 0.01 0.532 0.02 1.362 0.05 
Month 12 (TC. Dur)  1.249  0.01 1.031 0.05 1.531 0.07 0.842 0.01 0.377 0.04 1.253 0.07 
Month 24 (TC. Dur)  1.624  0.03 1.381 0.16 1.410 0.20 1.160 0.03 0.591 0.11 0.714 0.20 
Month 36 (TC. Dur)  2.629  0.05 3.051 0.20 2.620 0.26 2.845 0.03 3.532 0.09 2.983 0.17 
Dijt *(Age <30)   -0.020  0.00 0.060 0.02 0.073 0.04 0.006 0.00 0.024 0.01 0.018 0.03 
Dijt ^ 2*(Age <30)  0.000  0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.009 0.00 -0.000 0.00 -0.002 0.00 -0.002 0.00 
Dijt *(Age:30-45)   -0.012  0.00 0.062 0.02 0.039 0.04 0.008 0.00 0.064 0.01 0.081 0.03 
Dijt ^2 *(Age:30-45)  0.000  0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.003 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.007 0.00 
Dijt *(Age >45)  0.011  0.00 0.080 0.02 0.033 0.06 0.009 0.00 0.055 0.00 -0.034 0.04 
Dijt ^2 *(Age >45)  -0.002  0.00 -0.007 0.00 -0.004 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.005 0.00 0.003 0.00 
Age <30  0.540  0.04 0.417 0.12 0.403 0.27 0.635 0.03 0.659 0.08 0.037 0.23 
Age 30-45  0.132  0.03 -0.024 0.11 -0.069 0.25 0.256 0.03 0.269 0.07 -0.312 0.23 
Dij  -0.052 0.01  0.253 0.04  -0.141 0.067 -0.101 0.01 -0.040 0.04 0.081 0.11 
Djt  0.061  0.01 -0.058 0.05 -0.039 0.11 -0.008 0.01 -0.053 0.03 -0.004 0.09 
Dj  -  - - - - -  0.014 0.01  0.236  0.05  -0.278  0.11 
Age  -0.002  0.00 0.109 0.01 0.100 0.02 0.024 0.00 0.122 0.01 0.156 0.01 
Age^2  0.000  0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.002 0.00 
Dempleo  0.050  0.14 -2.950 0.47 -0.047 1.09 1.037 0.11 0.078 0.35 -0.712 1.00 
Unemp. Rage   -0.011 0.00  0.006 0.01  -0.018 0.01  0.006 0.00 0.036 0.00 -0.044 0.01 
T.c. GDP   -0.037 0.01  0.023 0.03  -0.016 0.06  -0.011 0.01 0.051 0.02 0.000 0.05 
Unemp. Rage*(Age <30)  0.020  0.01 0.001 0.02 0.041 0.05 0.028 0.01 0.026 0.02 0.098 0.04 
T.c. GDP*(Age <30)  0.026  0.01 0.024 0.03 -0.061 0.06 0.006 0.01 -0.003 0.02 -0.005 0.05 
Unemp. Rage*(Age 30-45) -0.005  0.00 0.008 0.01 0.007 0.01 -0.014 0.00 -0.005 0.00 0.027 0.01 
T.c. GDP*(Age 30-45)  0.004  0.00 0.011 0.01 0.029 0.01 -0.006 0.00 -0.002 0.00 0.021 0.01 
Part-time Job  0.133  0.01 0.092 0.02 0.065 0.04 0.311 0.01 0.209 0.03 0.324  0.054
High Wage Category   -0.415  0.01 -0.077 0.03 -0.189 0.08 -0.684 0.01 -0.422 0.04 -0.534 0.10 
Medium-High Wage Cat.  -0.090  0.01 -0.067 0.03 0.246 0.06 -0.250 0.01 -0.260 0.03 -0.101 0.07 
Medium-Low Wage Cat.  -0.035  0.01 -0.123 0.02 0.339 0.04 -0.118 0.00 -0.066 0.02 -0.036 0.04 
Inmigrant  0.123  0.01 -0.173 0.06 0.274 0.10 0.135 0.01 -0.120 0.03 -0.088 0.09 
Layoff  1.055  0.01 2.122 0.05 1.664 0.07 0.925 0.01 2.010 0.03 1.788 0.07 
Big Firm  -0.188  0.01 0.583 0.02 0.281 0.05 -0.173 0.01 0.287 0.03 0.347 0.05 
New Firm  -0.068 0.01  -0.092 0.02  0.007 0.04  0.017 0.00 -0.052 0.02 -0.152 0.04 
Private  0.053  0.01 0.024 0.03 1.661 0.10 -0.038 0.01 0.078 0.03 1.908 0.14 
Cte  -7.091  0.06 -13.44 0.22 -15.96 0.45 -6.684 0.05 -13.57 0.15 -16.25 0.44 
U= Unemployment or Different Firm; TC= Temporary Contract and Same Firm; PC = Permanent Contract and Same Firm 
We also control for time and quarterly dummies and for sector of activity. 








11.  Table 11: Main Results of the Effects of the Wage Subsidy by Gender and Age (Exit from 
a Temporary Contract) 
 
       To U  To T. C.   To P. C.  
Staying at 
TC 
Odd Ratio  27.43%  0.91%  -  16.57% 
Marginal Effect  -1.51%*   2.86%*  6.68%**  0.08%*  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   -8.07% 16.08%  26.26%  1.09% 
Odd Ratio  22.43%  -1.31%  -  14.23% 
Marginal Effect  -0.60%*  2.95%*  1.99%*  0.09%**  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   -6.34%* 16.18%*  23.59%  0.97%** 
Odd Ratio  2.60%  -16.27%  -  3.56% 
Marginal Effect  -0.58%**  5.10%*  -0.65%*  0.03%* 
Women 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   1.21% 23.53%  11.48%  0.47% 
Odd Ratio  5.72%  -3.39%  -  2.21% 
Marginal Effect  -0.70%**  1.22%**  -0.50%  0.05%**  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   -3.11% 6.02%  2.42%  0.21% 
Odd Ratio  21.81%  4.24%  -  22.56% 
Marginal Effect  -0.48%*  2.82%*  4.45%*  0.02%*  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   0.48% 17.42%  22.40%  -0.13% 
Odd Ratio  -10.90%  -21.47%*  -  -9.71% 
Marginal Effect  -0.32%**  2.08%  0.27%  0.01%* 
Men 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   1.17% 14.79%  -9.86%  -0.16% 
U= Unemployment or Different Firm; TC= Temporary Contract and Same Firm; PC = Permanent Contract and Same Firm 
* Marginal Effect statistically significant at 95% 
** Marginal Effect statistically significant at 90%  
The rest of coefficients are not statistically significant 
The Odd Ratio is measuring the behavior of the probability of having a permanent contract relative to the rest of alternatives for 
treated workers when the wage subsidy is in its sample average value (5100 Euros). 








12.  Table 12: Competing Risk Duration Model by Gender (Initial State=Unemployed) 
  Woman Men 
  TC PC  TC  PC 
 Coef.  sd  Coef. sd  Coef. sd  Coef. sd 
U. Dur. (ln)  -0.422  0.01  -0.283 0.02  -0.410 0.01  -0.491  0.01 
U. Dur. (ln)^2  0.030  0.00  -0.041 0.01  -0.019 0.00  0.036  0.00 
Dijt *(Age <30)   0.001  0.00  0.031 0.01  0.073 0.00  0.032  0.01 
Dijt ^ 2*(Age <30)  -0.000  0.00  -0.001 0.00  -0.001 0.00  -0.001  0.00 
Dijt *(Age:30-45)   0.011  0.00  0.004 0.01  0.009 0.00  0.020  0.01 
Dijt ^2 *(Age:30-45)  -0.000  0.00  0.002 0.00  -0.000 0.00  -0.000  0.00 
Dijt *(Age >45)  0.014  0.01  -0.015 0.01  0.003 0.01  -0.022  0.01 
Dijt ^2 *(Age >45)  -0.000  0.00  0.004 0.00  0.000 0.00  0.002  0.00 
Age <30  1.043  0.04  1.129 0.08  0.967 0.03  0.592  0.06 
Age 30-45  0.340  0.03  0.376 0.07  0.335 0.03  0.052  0.06 
Dij  -0.045  0.01  -0.275 0.02  -0.051 0.01  -0.083  0.02 
Djt  -0.023  0.01  -0.094 0.03  -0.024 0.01  -0.040  0.02 
Dj  -  -  -  -  0.059 0.01  -0.180  0.03 
Age  0.131  0.00  0.214 0.00  0.149 0.00  0.232  0.00 
Age^2  -0.001  0.00  -0.002 0.00  -0.002 0.00  -0.003  0.00 
Received. U.B  -0.693  0.01  -0.371 0.02  -0.555 0.01  -0.309  0.02 
Dur. U.B.  0.083  0.01  0.142 0.01  0.027 0.01  0.096  0.01 
Dempleo  0.127  0.12  1.250 0.26  0.591 0.10  0.730  0.23 
Unemp. Rage   -0.007  0.00  -0.041 0.00  0.013 0.00  -0.055  0.00 
T.c. GDP   0.016  0.01  0.034 0.02  0.007 0.01  0.034  0.01 
Unemp. Rage*(Age <30)  -0.018  0.01  -0.038 0.01  -0.014 0.01  -0.037  0.01 
T.c. GDP*(Age <30)  -0.031  0.01  -0.081 0.02  -0.006 0.01  -0.068  0.01 
Unemp. Rage*(Age 30-45)  -0.006  0.00  0.002 0.00  -0.019 0.00  0.017  0.00 
T.c. GDP*(Age 30-45)  0.001  0.00  -0.005 0.00  -0.010 0.00  0.007  0.00 
Part-time Job  -0.116  0.00  -0.061 0.01  -0.195 0.00  -0.163  0.01 
Temp. Help Agency  0.252  0.01  -0.018 0.02  0.255 0.01  -0.137  0.02 
High Wage Category   0.202  0.01  0.056 0.02  -0.180 0.01  0.328  0.02 
Medium-High Wage Cat.  0.035  0.01  0.128 0.01  -0.135 0.01  0.200  0.01 
Medium-Low Wage Cat.  0.061  0.01  0.187 0.01  0.045 0.00  0.164  0.01 
Inmigrant  0.164  0.01  0.238 0.03  0.179 0.01  0.153  0.02 
Layoff  0.224  0.01  -0.221 0.01  0.101 0.00  -0.169  0.01 
Big Firm  0.090  0.01  -0.027 0.01  0.014 0.01  -0.037  0.01 
New Firm  0.010  0.00  0.040 0.01  0.023 0.00  0.016  0.01 
Same Firm  0.847  0.00  0.279 0.01  0.622 0.00  0.111  0.01 
Constant Term  -5.080  0.05  -7.412 0.10  -5.465 0.04  -6.781  0.09 
TC= Temporary Contract; PC = Permanent Contract 
* Marginal Effect statistically significant at 95% 
** Marginal Effect statistically significant at 90%  
The rest of coefficients are not statistically significant 
The Odd Ratio is measuring the behavior of the probability of having a permanent contract relative to the rest of 
alternatives for treated workers when the wage subsidy is in its sample average value (5100 Euros). 










13.  Table 13: Main Results by Gender and Age of the Policy Variable (Exit from 
Unemployment) 
 
      To T. C.   To P. C.  
Stayed 
Unemployed 
Odd Ratio  14.56%  -  15.36% 
Marginal Effect  -0.01%*  2.55%**  -0.06%*  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   0.16% 14.97% -0.34% 
Odd Ratio  -0.16%  -  7.39% 
Marginal Effect  0.55%*  2.26%*  -0.13%**  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   3.96%* 6.46%  -0.68%** 
Odd Ratio  -5.80%  -  1.41% 
Marginal Effect  1.07%*  2.41%**  -0.21%* 
Women 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   6.27% 0.66% -0.86% 
Odd Ratio  7.59%  -  14.66% 
Marginal Effect  -0.26%**  2.38%  -0.01%**  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   0.75% 14.40%  -0.41%** 
Odd Ratio  3.18%  -  8.61% 
Marginal Effect  0.43%*  1.33%*  -0.10%  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   2.96% 8.36% -0.66% 
Odd Ratio  -6.32%*  -  -5.72% 
Marginal Effect  0.52%  0.20%  -0.09% 
Men 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   2.03% -5.79% -0.22% 
TC= Temporary Contract; PC = Permanent Contract 
* Marginal Effect statistically significant at 95% 
** Marginal Effect statistically significant at 90%  
The rest of coefficients are not statistically significant 
The Odd Ratio is measuring the behavior of the probability of having a permanent contract relative to the rest of 
alternatives for treated workers when the wage subsidy is in its sample average value (5100 Euros). 










14.  Table 14: Competing Risk Duration Model (Initial State=Permanent Contact) 
  Woman Men 
  U TC  PC  U  TC  PC 
  Coef.  sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd Coef. sd 
PC. Dur. (ln)  -1.307  0.04 -1.538 0.10 -1.558 0.11 -1.328 0.04 -1.412 0.08 -1.540 0.11 
PC. Dur. (ln)^2  0.247  0.01 0.268 0.02 0.311 0.02 0.250 0.01 0.26 0.02  0.311  0.02 
Month 6 (P.C Dur)  0.412  0.03 0.200 0.10 0.188 0.12 0.582 0.03 0.456 0.08 0.283 0.11 
Month 12 (PC. Dur)  0.229  0.04 0.221 0.12 0.270 0.15 0.288 0.04 0.114 0.10 0.296 0.13 
Month 24 (PC. Dur)  0.071  0.06 0.018 0.17 0.087 0.20 0.022 0.06 -0.179 0.15 -0.486 0.23 
Month 36 (PC. Dur)  -0.091  0.08 -0.254 0.24 0.175 0.22 -0.297 0.08 -0.025 0.16 -0.057 0.21 
Dijt *(Age <30)   -0.079  0.01 -0.017 0.04 0.108 0.04 -0.009 0.01 -0.065 0.02 -0.034 0.03 
Dijt ^ 2*(Age <30)  0.007 0.00  0.003 0.00  -0.004 0.00  0.002 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.004 0.00 
Dijt *(Age:30-45)   -0.036  0.01 0.035 0.05 0.186 0.06 -0.018 0.01 -0.060 0.03 -0.002 0.00 
Dijt ^2 *(Age:30-45)  0.004  0.00 -0.003 0.00 -0.011 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.006 0.00 -0.002 0.00 
Dijt *(Age >45)  -0.008  0.02 0.031 0.07 0.138 0.08 -0.004 0.02 0.012 0.05 0.025 0.06 
Dijt ^2 *(Age >45)  0.001  0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.007 0.01 0.002 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.004 0.01 
(Age <30)  1.535  0.09 1.757 0.34 1.870 0.33 1.616 0.1 1.639  0.23  1.963  0.31 
(Age 30-45)  0.416  0.09 0.633 0.34 0.653 0.33 0.692 0.09 0.733 0.23 0.948  0.3 
Dij  -0.011  0.02 -0.099 0.07 -0.271 0.09 -0.189 0.04 0.005 0.09 0.227 0.12 
Djt  0.095  0.04 -0.123 0.13 -0.366 0.15 -0.055 0.03 0.121 0.08 -0.004 0.10 
Dj  -  - - - - -  0.155 0.04  0.046  0.1  -0.407  0.13 
Age  0.083  0.01 0.062 0.02 0.147 0.02  0.11  0.01 0.127 0.01 0.184 0.02 
Age^2  -0.001  0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.002 0.00 
Unemp. Rate   -0.054  0.02 -0.033 0.02 -0.005 0.02 -0.009 0.00 0.015 0.01 -0.015 0.02 
T.c. GDP   -0.026  0.02 -0.036 0.07 0.004 0.07 -0.016 0.02 -0.107 0.05 -0.052 0.07 
Unemp. Rage*(Age <30)  0.015 0.00  0.055 0.07  -0.015 0.07  0.007 0.02 0.086 0.05 0.043 0.07 
T.c. GDP*(Age <30)  0.022  0.01 -0.016 0.08 -0.170 0.08 -0.013 0.02 0.001 0.06 -0.046 0.07 
Unemp. Rage*(Age 30-45) -0.005  0.00 0.011 0.02 -0.023 0.02 -0.004 0.00 -0.021 0.01 -0.011 0.02 
T.c. GDP*(Age 30-45)  0.004  0.00 0.030 0.02 0.022 0.02 -0.002 0.00 -0.011 0.01 -0.003 0.02 
Part-time Job  0.285  0.02 0.248 0.05 0.132 0.06 0.789 0.02 0.579 0.05 0.341 0.07 
High Wage Category   -0.641  0.03 -1.093 0.10 -0.741 0.10 -0.706 0.03 -1.562 0.09 -0.404 0.08 
Medium-High Wage Cat.  -0.426  0.02 -0.607 0.06 -0.481 0.07 -0.369 0.02 -0.629 0.05 -0.088 0.06 
Medium-Low Wage Cat.  -0.180  0.02 -0.307 0.05 -0.185 0.06 -0.305 0.02 -0.353 0.04 -0.204 0.05 
Inmigrant  0.378  0.04 0.432 0.10 0.274 0.14 0.342 0.03 0.259 0.07 0.030 0.11 
Layoff  1.624  0.02 0.924 0.05 0.756 0.05 1.773 0.02 1.146 0.04 0.809 0.05 
Big Firm  -0.197  0.02 -0.278 0.06 -0.431 0.07 -0.333 0.02 -0.441 0.06 -0.530 0.07 
New Firm  0.147  0.01 0.183 0.04 0.177 0.05 0.176 0.01 0.223 0.03 0.069 0.04 
Private  0.114 0.04  -0.040 0.12  0.534 0.15  0.329 0.05 0.354 0.17 0.326 0.16 
Same Firm  1.290  0.02 0.040 0.08 2.073 0.06 1.300 0.02 0.279 0.07 2.162 0.06 
Temp. Help Agency  0.534  0.11 0.881 0.22 0.947 0.26 0.714 0.13 1.268 0.21 1.715 0.24 
Constant Term  -6.110  0.18 -7.550 0.58 -10.05 0.64 -6.824 0.17 -8.592 0.39 -9.746 0.53 
U= Unemployment ; TC= Temporary Contract; PC = Permanent Contract 
We also control for time and quarterly dummies and for sector of activity. 














       To U.  To T. C.   To P. C.  
Staying at 
PC 
Odd Ratio  -20.58%  -0.98%  57.33%  - 
Marginal Effect  3.26%**  1.69%*  10.19%**  -0.03%*  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   -20.45% -0.82%  57.57% 0.15% 
Odd Ratio  -7.72%  9.62%  95.17%  - 
Marginal Effect  -5.36%**  0.95%*  21.26%**  -0.03%**  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   -7.71% 9.63%  95.19%  0.01% 
Odd Ratio  -2.56%  15.00%  67.58%  - 
Marginal Effect  -14.24%**  2.51%*  13.61%**  -0.01% 
Women 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   -2.58% 14.97%  67.53%  -0.59% 
Odd Ratio  0.57%  -19.70%  -5.92%  - 
Marginal Effect  1.28%**  0.30%**  2.04%  -0.01%**  Age <30 
Total Change in Probability   0.60% -19.67%  -5.89% 0.03% 
Odd Ratio  -1.49%  -14.45%  3.48%  - 
Marginal Effect  1.58%*  2.37%*  1.46%*  -0.01%*  Age 30-45 
Total Change in Probability   -1.46% -14.43%  3.48% 0.03% 
Odd Ratio  2.52%  3.76%*  3.36%  - 
Marginal Effect  1.43%  0.40%  -0.46%  -0.01%* 
Men 
Age >45 
Total Change in Probability   2.50% 3.73%  3.33%  -0.02% 
* Marginal Effect statistically significant at 95% 
** Marginal Effect statistically significant at 90%  
The rest of coefficients are not statistically significant 
The Odd Ratio measures the behavior of the probability of staying at the permanent contract relative to the rest of alternatives for 
treated workers when the wage subsidy is 5100 Euros 
The marginal effect is measured at the average wage subsidy of 5100 Euros. 
 